perm filename MENTAL.XGP[F75,JMC] blob
sn#211810 filedate 1976-04-22 generic text, type T, neo UTF8
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␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓/COMPACT; INDENT 5;
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ∧ASCRIBING MENTAL QUALITIES TO MACHINES
␈↓ α∧␈↓ To␈αascribe␈αcertain␈α␈↓↓beliefs␈↓,␈α␈↓↓knowledge␈↓,␈α
␈↓↓free␈αwill␈↓,␈α␈↓↓intentions␈↓,␈α ␈↓↓consciousness␈↓,␈α ␈↓↓abilities␈↓␈α
or␈α␈↓↓wants␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓to␈α
a␈α
machine␈α
or␈α∞computer␈α
program␈α
is␈α
␈↓αlegitimate␈↓␈α
when␈α∞such␈α
an␈α
ascription␈α
expresses␈α∞ the␈α
same
␈↓ α∧␈↓information␈α∂ about␈α∂ the␈α∂machine␈α∂that␈α∂it␈α∂expresses␈α∂about␈α∂a␈α∂person.␈α∂ It␈α∂ is␈α∂ ␈↓αuseful␈↓␈α∂ when␈α∞ the
␈↓ α∧␈↓ascription␈α helps␈α us␈αunderstand␈αthe␈αstructure␈αof␈αthe␈αmachine,␈αits␈αpast␈αor␈αfuture␈αbehavior,␈αor␈αhow
␈↓ α∧␈↓to␈αrepair␈αor␈α
improve␈αit.␈α It␈α
is␈αperhaps␈αnever␈α
␈↓αlogically␈αrequired␈↓␈αeven␈α
for␈αhumans,␈αbut␈α
a␈αpractical
␈↓ α∧␈↓theory␈α∃of␈α∀the␈α∃behavior␈α∃of␈α∀machines␈α∃or␈α∀humans␈α∃may␈α∃require␈α∀mental␈α∃qualities␈α∃or␈α∀qualities
␈↓ α∧␈↓isomorphic␈α
to␈αthem.␈α
Theories␈α
of␈αbelief,␈α
knowledge␈α and␈α
wanting␈α
can␈αbe␈α
constructed␈αfor␈α
machines
␈↓ α∧␈↓in␈α∩a␈α∩simpler␈α∩setting␈α∩than␈α∩for␈α∩humans␈α∩and␈α∩later␈α∩applied␈α∩to␈α∩humans.␈α∩ Ascription␈α∩of␈α∩mental
␈↓ α∧␈↓qualities␈α∩is␈α∩␈↓αmost␈α∩straightforward␈↓␈α∩for␈α∩machines␈α∩of␈α∩known␈α∩structure␈α∩such␈α∩as␈α∩thermostats␈α∩and
␈↓ α∧␈↓computer␈α∞operating␈α∞systems,␈α∞but␈α∞is␈α∞␈↓αmost␈α∞useful␈↓␈α∞ when␈α∞applied␈α∞ to␈α∞ entities␈α∞ whose␈α∞ structure␈α
is
␈↓ α∧␈↓very incompletely known.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ The␈α
above␈α
views␈αare␈α
motivated␈α
by␈α
work␈αin␈α
artificial␈α
intelligence␈↓∧1␈↓␈α
(abbreviated␈α AI).␈α
They
␈↓ α∧␈↓can␈α be␈α
taken␈αas␈αasserting␈α
that␈αmany␈αof␈α
the␈αphilosophical␈α
problems␈α of␈αmind␈α
take␈αa␈αpractical␈α
form
␈↓ α∧␈↓as␈α∀soon␈α∀ as␈α∀one␈α∀ takes␈α∀ seriously␈α∀ the␈α∀idea␈α∀ of␈α∀ making␈α∀machines␈α∀ behave␈α∀intelligently.␈α∀ In
␈↓ α∧␈↓particular,␈α∪AI␈α∪raises␈α∪for␈α∪machines␈α∪two␈α∪issues␈α∪that␈α∪have␈α∪heretofore␈α∪been␈α∪considered␈α∪only␈α∪in
␈↓ α∧␈↓connection with people.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ First,␈αin␈αdesigning␈αintelligent␈αprograms␈α and␈αlooking␈αat␈αthem␈αfrom␈α the␈αoutside␈α we␈αneed␈α to
␈↓ α∧␈↓determine␈α the␈αconditions␈α
under␈αwhich␈αspecific␈αmental␈α
and␈αvolitional␈αterms␈α are␈α
applicable.␈α We
␈↓ α∧␈↓can␈α exemplify␈αthese␈α problems␈αby␈α asking␈α when␈α
it␈αis␈α legitimate␈α to␈α say␈αabout␈α a␈αmachine,␈α
␈↓↓"␈αIt
␈↓ α∧␈↓↓knows I want a reservation to Boston, and it can give it to me, but it won't"␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Second,␈αwhen␈αwe␈α want␈αa␈α␈↓αgenerally␈αintelligent␈↓␈↓∧2␈↓␈αcomputer␈αprogram,␈αwe␈αmust␈αbuild␈αinto␈αit␈αa
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓αgeneral␈α∃view␈↓␈α∃of␈α∃what␈α⊗the␈α∃world␈α∃is␈α∃like␈α∃with␈α⊗ especial␈α∃attention␈α∃to␈α∃facts␈α∃ about␈α⊗how␈α∃the
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|1␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓information␈α
required␈α
to␈αsolve␈α
problems␈α
is␈α
to␈αbe␈α
obtained␈α
and␈α
used.␈α Thus␈α
we␈α
must␈α
provide␈α it
␈↓ α∧␈↓with␈α some␈α
kind␈α of␈α ␈↓↓metaphysics␈↓␈α
(general␈αworld-view)␈α and␈α
␈↓↓epistemology␈↓␈α(theory␈αof␈α
knowledge)
␈↓ α∧␈↓however naive.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ As␈α⊂ much␈α⊂ as␈α⊂ possible,␈α⊂ we␈α⊃ will␈α⊂ ascribe␈α⊂ mental␈α⊂ qualities␈α⊂separately␈α⊂from␈α⊃ each␈α⊂other
␈↓ α∧␈↓instead␈α
of␈α
bundling␈α
them␈α
in␈α
a␈α
concept␈α
of␈α
mind.␈α
This␈α
is␈α
necessary,␈α
because␈α∞present␈α
machines
␈↓ α∧␈↓have␈αrather␈α varied␈α little␈α minds;␈α the␈α mental␈α qualities␈α that␈α can␈αlegitimately␈α be␈αascribed␈αto
␈↓ α∧␈↓them␈αare␈αfew␈α and␈αdiffer␈α
from␈αmachine␈αto␈αmachine.␈α We␈α
will␈α not␈α even␈αtry␈α to␈α meet␈α
objections
␈↓ α∧␈↓like, ␈↓↓"Unless it also does X, it is illegitimate to speak of its having mental qualities."␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Machines␈α
as␈α
simple␈α∞ as␈α
thermostats␈α
can␈α∞ be␈α
said␈α
to␈α∞ have␈α
beliefs,␈α
and␈α∞having␈α
beliefs
␈↓ α∧␈↓seems␈α⊃ to␈α∩be␈α⊃ a␈α∩characteristic␈α⊃ of␈α⊃most␈α∩machines␈α⊃ capable␈α∩of␈α⊃ problem␈α∩ solving␈α⊃ performance.
␈↓ α∧␈↓However,␈α⊂ the␈α⊂machines␈α⊂mankind␈α⊃has␈α⊂so␈α⊂far␈α⊂found␈α⊂ it␈α⊃useful␈α⊂to␈α⊂construct␈α⊂rarely␈α⊃have␈α⊂beliefs
␈↓ α∧␈↓about␈α∂beliefs.␈α⊂ (Beliefs␈α∂about␈α⊂ beliefs␈α∂will␈α⊂be␈α∂ needed␈α⊂by␈α∂computer␈α⊂programs␈α∂to␈α⊂reason␈α∂about
␈↓ α∧␈↓what␈α∪ knowledge␈α∪they␈α∪lack␈α∪and␈α∪where␈α∩to␈α∪ get␈α∪it).␈α∪ Mental␈α∪qualities␈α∪ peculiar␈α∪to␈α∩human-like
␈↓ α∧␈↓motivational␈α
structures,␈αsuch␈α
as␈αlove␈α
and␈αhate,␈α
will␈αnot␈α
be␈αrequired␈α
for␈αintelligent␈α
behavior,␈αbut
␈↓ α∧␈↓we␈α∞could␈α∞probably␈α∞program␈α∞ computers␈α∞to␈α∞exhibit␈α∞them␈α∞if␈α∞we␈α∞wanted␈α∞to,␈α∞ because␈α∂our␈α∞common
␈↓ α∧␈↓sense␈α⊂notions␈α⊃about␈α⊂them␈α⊂ translate␈α⊃ readily␈α⊂into␈α⊂ certain␈α⊃ program␈α⊂and␈α⊂ data␈α⊃structures.␈α⊂ Still
␈↓ α∧␈↓other␈α∂mental␈α∂qualities,␈α∂e.g.␈α∂ humor␈α∂and␈α∂appreciation␈α∂of␈α∂beauty,␈α∂seem␈α∂ much␈α∂harder␈α∂ to␈α∂ model.
␈↓ α∧␈↓While␈α⊂ we␈α∂will␈α⊂ be␈α∂ quite␈α⊂liberal␈α∂ in␈α⊂ascribing␈α∂␈↓↓some␈↓␈α⊂mental␈α∂qualities␈α⊂ even␈α∂to␈α⊂rather␈α∂primitive
␈↓ α∧␈↓machines, we will try to be conservative in our criteria for ascribing any ␈↓↓particular␈↓ quality.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ The␈α
successive␈α
sections␈α
of␈α
this␈α
paper␈α∞will␈α
give␈α
philosophical␈α
and␈α
AI␈α
reasons␈α∞for␈α
ascribing
␈↓ α∧␈↓beliefs␈αto␈αmachines,␈αtwo␈αnew␈αforms␈αof␈αdefinition␈αthat␈αseem␈αnecessary␈αfor␈αdefining␈αmental␈αqualities
␈↓ α∧␈↓and␈αexamples␈αof␈αtheir␈αuse,␈αexamples␈αof␈αsystems␈αto␈αwhich␈αmental␈αqualities␈αare␈αascribed,␈αsome␈αfirst
␈↓ α∧␈↓attempts␈α∩at␈α∩defining␈α⊃a␈α∩variety␈α∩of␈α∩mental␈α⊃qualities,␈α∩some␈α∩criticisms␈α⊃of␈α∩other␈α∩views␈α∩on␈α⊃mental
␈↓ α∧␈↓qualities, notes, and references.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|2␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ∧fWHY ASCRIBE MENTAL QUALITIES?
␈↓ α∧␈↓ ␈↓αWhy␈α∩ should␈α∩we␈α∩want␈α∩to␈α∩ ascribe␈α∪beliefs␈α∩to␈α∩ machines␈α∩ at␈α∩all?␈↓␈α∩This␈α∩is␈α∪the␈α∩opposite
␈↓ α∧␈↓question␈α∂to␈α∂that␈α∂involved␈α∂in␈α∂the␈α⊂controversy␈α∂over␈α∂␈↓↓reductionism␈↓.␈α∂ Instead␈α∂of␈α∂asking␈α⊂how␈α∂mental
␈↓ α∧␈↓qualities␈α⊂can␈α⊂be␈α⊂␈↓αreduced␈↓␈α⊂to␈α⊂physical␈α⊂ones,␈α∂we␈α⊂ask␈α⊂how␈α⊂to␈α⊂␈↓αascribe␈↓␈α⊂mental␈α⊂qualities␈α⊂to␈α∂physical
␈↓ α∧␈↓systems.␈α∂ In␈α⊂our␈α∂opinion,␈α∂this␈α⊂question␈α∂is␈α⊂more␈α∂natural␈α∂and␈α⊂may␈α∂lead␈α∂to␈α⊂better␈α∂answers␈α⊂to␈α∂the
␈↓ α∧␈↓questions of reductionism.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ To␈α
put␈α
the␈α
issue␈α
sharply,␈α
consider␈α a␈α
computer␈α
program␈α
for␈α
which␈α
we␈α
possess␈αcomplete
␈↓ α∧␈↓listings.␈α The␈αbehavior␈αof␈α the␈αprogram␈αin␈αany␈αenvironment␈αis␈αdetermined␈αfrom␈α the␈αstructure␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α∪program␈α∪ and␈α∪can␈α∪be␈α∩ found␈α∪out␈α∪ by␈α∪simulating␈α∪ the␈α∩action␈α∪of␈α∪ the␈α∪program␈α∪ and␈α∩the
␈↓ α∧␈↓environment␈α⊂ without␈α∂ having␈α⊂ to␈α∂deal␈α⊂ with␈α⊂ any␈α∂ concept␈α⊂ of␈α∂belief.␈α⊂ Nevertheless,␈α⊂there␈α∂ are
␈↓ α∧␈↓several reasons for ascribing belief and other mental qualities:
␈↓ α∧␈↓1.␈α∩Although␈α⊃we␈α∩may␈α⊃know␈α∩the␈α⊃program,␈α∩its␈α⊃state␈α∩at␈α⊃a␈α∩given␈α⊃moment␈α∩is␈α⊃usually␈α∩not␈α⊃directly
␈↓ α∧␈↓observable,␈α
and␈α
the␈α
conclusions␈α
we␈α
can␈α
draw␈α
about␈α
its␈α
current␈α
state␈α
may␈α
be␈α
more␈α
readily␈α
expressed
␈↓ α∧␈↓by ascribing certain beliefs or wants than in any other way.
␈↓ α∧␈↓2.␈α∞Even␈α∞if␈α∂we␈α∞can␈α∞simulate␈α∞the␈α∂interaction␈α∞of␈α∞our␈α∞program␈α∂with␈α∞its␈α∞environment␈α∂using␈α∞another
␈↓ α∧␈↓more␈α
comprehensive␈α
program,␈αthe␈α
simulation␈α
may␈α
be␈αa␈α
billion␈α
times␈α
too␈αslow.␈α
We␈α
also␈α
may␈αnot
␈↓ α∧␈↓have␈αthe␈αinitial␈αconditions␈αof␈αthe␈αenvironment␈αor␈αthe␈αenvironment's␈αlaws␈αof␈αmotion␈αin␈α a␈αsuitable
␈↓ α∧␈↓form,␈αwhereas␈α it␈αmay␈α be␈αfeasible␈α to␈αmake␈α a␈αprediction␈αof␈α the␈αeffects␈αof␈αthe␈α beliefs␈αwe␈αascribe
␈↓ α∧␈↓to the program without any computer at all.
␈↓ α∧␈↓3.␈α⊂Ascribing␈α⊂beliefs␈α⊂may␈α⊂allow␈α⊂deriving␈α⊂general␈α⊂statements␈α⊂about␈α⊂the␈α⊂program's␈α⊂behavior␈α∂that
␈↓ α∧␈↓could not be obtained from any finite number of simulations.
␈↓ α∧␈↓4.␈α
The␈α
belief␈α
and␈α
goal␈α
structures␈α
we␈α
ascribe␈α
to␈α
the␈α
program␈α
may␈α
be␈α
easier␈α
to␈α
understand␈α
than
␈↓ α∧␈↓the details of program as expressed in its listing.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|3␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓5.␈αThe␈αbelief␈αand␈αgoal␈αstructure␈αis␈αlikely␈αto␈αbe␈αclose␈αto␈αthe␈αstructure␈αthe␈αdesigner␈α of␈αthe␈α program
␈↓ α∧␈↓had␈α
in␈α
mind,␈α
and␈α
it␈α
may␈α
be␈α
easier␈αto␈α
debug␈α
the␈α
program␈α
in␈α
terms␈α
of␈α
this␈α
structure␈αthan␈α
directly
␈↓ α∧␈↓from␈α
the␈α
listing.␈α
In␈α
fact,␈αit␈α
is␈α
often␈α
possible␈α
for␈α
someone␈αto␈α
correct␈α
a␈α
fault␈α
by␈α
reasoning␈α in
␈↓ α∧␈↓general␈α
terms␈α
about␈α
the␈α
information␈α
in␈α
a␈α
program␈α
or␈α
machine,␈α
diagnosing␈α
what␈α
is␈α
wrong␈α∞as␈α
a
␈↓ α∧␈↓false␈α∂belief,␈α∞and␈α∂ looking␈α∂ at␈α∞ the␈α∂ details␈α∂ of␈α∞ the␈α∂ program␈α∂ or␈α∞ machine␈α∂ only␈α∂sufficiently␈α∞to
␈↓ α∧␈↓determine how the false belief is represented and what mechanism caused it to arise.␈↓∧3␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ All␈α∩the␈α⊃above␈α∩reasons␈α⊃for␈α∩ascribing␈α⊃beliefs␈α∩are␈α⊃epistemological.␈α∩ i.e.␈α⊃ascribing␈α∩beliefs␈α⊃is
␈↓ α∧␈↓needed␈α⊂to␈α⊂adapt␈α∂to␈α⊂limitations␈α⊂on␈α∂our␈α⊂ability␈α⊂to␈α∂acquire␈α⊂knowledge,␈α⊂use␈α∂it␈α⊂for␈α⊂prediction,␈α∂and
␈↓ α∧␈↓establish␈αgeneralizations␈αin␈αterms␈αof␈αthe␈αelementary␈αstructure␈αof␈αthe␈αprogram.␈α Perhaps␈αthis␈αis␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓general reason for ascribing higher levels of organization to systems.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Computers␈αgive␈αrise␈αto␈αnumerous␈αexamples␈αof␈αbuilding␈αa␈αhigher␈αstructure␈αon␈αthe␈αbasis␈αof␈αa
␈↓ α∧␈↓lower␈α
and␈α
conducting␈α
subsequent␈α
analyses␈α
using␈α
the␈α
higher␈α
structure.␈α
The␈α
geometry␈α
of␈αthe␈α
electric
␈↓ α∧␈↓fields␈α
in␈αa␈α
transistor␈α
and␈αits␈α
chemical␈α
composition␈αgive␈α
rise␈αto␈α
its␈α
properties␈αas␈α
an␈α
electric␈αcircuit
␈↓ α∧␈↓element.␈α
Transistors␈α
are␈αcombined␈α
in␈α
small␈αcircuits␈α
and␈α
powered␈α
in␈αstandard␈α
ways␈α
to␈αmake␈α
logical
␈↓ α∧␈↓elements␈α
such␈α∞as␈α
ANDs,␈α∞ORs,␈α
NOTs␈α∞and␈α
flip-flops.␈α∞ Computers␈α
are␈α∞designed␈α
with␈α∞these␈α
logical
␈↓ α∧␈↓elements␈αto␈αobey␈αa␈αdesired␈αorder␈αcode;␈αthe␈αdesigner␈αusually␈αneedn't␈αconsider␈αthe␈αproperties␈α
of␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓transistors␈αas␈αcircuit␈α
elements.␈α The␈αdesigner␈α
of␈αa␈αhigher␈α
level␈αlanguage␈αworks␈α
with␈αthe␈αorder␈α
code
␈↓ α∧␈↓and␈α⊂doesn't␈α∂have␈α⊂to␈α⊂know␈α∂about␈α⊂the␈α⊂ANDs␈α∂and␈α⊂ORs;␈α∂the␈α⊂user␈α⊂of␈α∂the␈α⊂higher␈α⊂order␈α∂language
␈↓ α∧␈↓needn't know the computer's order code.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ In␈αthe␈αabove␈αcases,␈αusers␈αof␈αthe␈α
higher␈αlevel␈αcan␈αcompletely␈αignore␈α the␈αlower␈αlevel,␈α
because
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α
behavior␈α
of␈α
the␈α
higher␈α level␈α
system␈α
is␈α
completely␈α
determined␈αby␈α
the␈α
values␈α
of␈α
the␈αhigher
␈↓ α∧␈↓level␈α∂ variables;␈α∞e.g.␈α∂ in␈α∞order␈α∂to␈α∂determine␈α∞ the␈α∂outcome␈α∞of␈α∂a␈α∞ computer␈α∂program,␈α∂one␈α∞needn't
␈↓ α∧␈↓consider␈αthe␈αflip-flops.␈α
However,␈αwhen␈αwe␈αascribe␈α
mental␈αstructure␈αto␈α
humans␈αor␈αgoals␈αto␈α
society,
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|4␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓we␈α∞always␈α∞get␈α∞highly␈α∂ incomplete␈α∞systems;␈α∞the␈α∞ higher␈α∂level␈α∞behavior␈α∞ cannot␈α∞be␈α∂fully␈α∞predicted
␈↓ α∧␈↓from␈α higher␈α level␈αobservations␈α and␈α higher␈α level␈α"laws"␈αeven␈αwhen␈αthe␈αunderlying␈α
lower␈αlevel
␈↓ α∧␈↓behavior is determinate.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Besides␈α
the␈α
above␈αphilosophical␈α
reasons␈α
for␈αascribing␈α
mental␈α
qualities␈αto␈α
machines,␈α
I␈αshall
␈↓ α∧␈↓argue␈α⊂that␈α⊂in␈α⊂order␈α⊂to␈α⊂make␈α⊂machines␈α∂behave␈α⊂intelligently,␈α⊂we␈α⊂will␈α⊂have␈α⊂to␈α⊂program␈α⊂them␈α∂to
␈↓ α∧␈↓ascribe beliefs etc. to each other and to people.
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→Here there will be more on machine's models of each others minds.←←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|5␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ¬εTWO METHODS OF DEFINITION
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ βnAND THEIR APPLICATION TO MENTAL QUALITIES
␈↓ α∧␈↓ In␈α∂our␈α⊂opinion,␈α∂a␈α∂major␈α⊂source␈α∂of␈α⊂problems␈α∂in␈α∂defining␈α⊂mental␈α∂and␈α⊂other␈α∂philosophical
␈↓ α∧␈↓concepts␈α
is␈α
the␈α
weakness␈αof␈α
the␈α
methods␈α
of␈α
definition␈αthat␈α
have␈α
been␈α
␈↓↓explicitly␈↓␈α
used.␈α Therefore
␈↓ α∧␈↓we␈α
introduce␈α
two␈α
new␈↓∧4␈↓␈α
kinds␈α
of␈α
definition:␈α
␈↓↓second␈α
order␈α
structural␈α
definition␈↓␈α
and␈α␈↓↓definition␈α
relative
␈↓ α∧␈↓↓to an approximate theory␈↓ and their application to defining mental qualities.
␈↓ α∧␈↓1. ␈↓αSecond Order Structural Definition.␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Structural␈α⊃definitions␈α∩of␈α⊃qualities␈α⊃are␈α∩given␈α⊃in␈α⊃terms␈α∩of␈α⊃the␈α⊃state␈α∩of␈α⊃the␈α∩ system␈α⊃being
␈↓ α∧␈↓described while behavioral definitions are given in terms of its actual or potential behavior␈↓∧5␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ If␈α∞the␈α∞structure␈α∞of␈α∞the␈α∞machine␈α∞is␈α∞known,␈α∞one␈α∞can␈α∞give␈α∞an␈α∞ad␈α∞hoc␈α∞␈↓↓first␈α∞ order␈α∞ structural
␈↓ α∧␈↓↓definition␈↓.␈α This␈αis␈αa␈α
predicate␈α␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓␈αwhere␈α␈↓↓s␈↓␈α
represents␈αa␈αstate␈αof␈α
the␈αmachine␈αand␈α␈↓↓p␈↓␈α
represents
␈↓ α∧␈↓a␈α
sentence␈α
in␈α
a␈α
suitable␈α
language,␈αand␈α
␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓␈α
is␈α
the␈α
assertion␈α
that␈αwhen␈α
the␈α
machine␈α
is␈α
in␈α
state␈α␈↓↓s,␈↓␈α
it
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓believes␈↓␈αthe␈αsentence␈α␈↓↓p.␈↓␈α (Note␈αthat␈αa␈αsentence␈αis␈αthe␈αobject␈αbelieved␈αrather␈αthan␈αtaking␈αbelief␈αas␈αa
␈↓ α∧␈↓modal␈α∪operator).␈α∪ A␈α∪general␈α∪␈↓↓first␈↓␈α∪␈↓↓order␈↓␈α∪structural␈α∪definition␈α∪of␈α∪belief␈α∪would␈α∪be␈α∪a␈α∪predicate
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓B(W,M,s,p)␈↓␈α∂where␈α∞␈↓↓W␈↓␈α∂is␈α∞the␈α∂"world"␈α∞in␈α∂which␈α∞the␈α∂machine␈α∞␈↓↓M␈↓␈α∂whose␈α∞beliefs␈α∂are␈α∞in␈α∂question␈α∞is
␈↓ α∧␈↓situated.␈α⊃ I␈α⊃do␈α⊃not␈α⊂see␈α⊃how␈α⊃to␈α⊃give␈α⊃such␈α⊂a␈α⊃definition␈α⊃of␈α⊃belief,␈α⊂and␈α⊃I␈α⊃think␈α⊃it␈α⊃is␈α⊂impossible.
␈↓ α∧␈↓Therefore we turn to second order definitions.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ A␈α∪second␈α∪order␈α∪structural␈α∪definition␈α∀of␈α∪belief␈α∪is␈α∪a␈α∪second␈α∪order␈α∀predicate␈α∪␈↓↓β(W,M,B).␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓β(W,M,B)␈↓␈αasserts␈αthat␈αthe␈αfirst␈αorder␈αpredicate␈α␈↓↓B␈↓␈αis␈αa␈α"good"␈αnotion␈αof␈αbelief␈αfor␈αthe␈αmachine␈α␈↓↓M␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓in␈αthe␈αworld␈α␈↓↓W.␈↓␈α Here␈α"good"␈αmeans␈αthat␈αthe␈αbeliefs␈αthat␈α␈↓↓B␈↓␈αascribes␈αto␈α␈↓↓M␈↓␈αagree␈αwith␈αour␈αideas␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓what␈α⊂beliefs␈α∂␈↓↓M␈↓␈α⊂would␈α∂have,␈α⊂not␈α⊂that␈α∂the␈α⊂beliefs␈α∂themselves␈α⊂are␈α∂true.␈α⊂ The␈α⊂axiomatizations␈α∂of
␈↓ α∧␈↓belief in the literature are partial second order definitions.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ In␈α⊂general,␈α⊂␈↓αa␈α⊃second␈α⊂order␈α⊂definition␈α⊃gives␈α⊂criteria␈α⊂for␈α⊃criticizing␈α⊂an␈α⊂ascription␈α⊃of␈α⊂a
␈↓ α∧␈↓αquality␈αto␈αa␈αsystem.␈↓␈αWe␈αsuggest␈αthat␈αboth␈αour␈αcommon␈αsense␈αand␈αscientific␈αusage␈αof␈αnot-directly-
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|6␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓observable␈α
qualities␈αcorresponds␈α
more␈α
losely␈αto␈α
second␈αorder␈α
structural␈α
definition␈αthan␈α
to␈αany␈α
kind
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈α∂behavioral␈α∂definition.␈α∂ Note␈α∂that␈α∂ a␈α∂ second␈α∂order␈α∂ definition␈α∂cannot␈α∂ guarantee␈α∂ that␈α∞ there
␈↓ α∧␈↓exist␈α
predicates␈α ␈↓↓B␈↓␈α
meeting␈α
the␈αcriterion␈α
β␈α
or␈αthat␈α
such␈α
a␈α␈↓↓B␈↓␈α
is␈α
unique.␈α Some␈α
qualities␈α
are␈αbest
␈↓ α∧␈↓defined jointly with related qualities, e.g. beliefs and goals may require joint treatment.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Second␈α∪ order␈α∪ definitions␈α∪criticize␈α∀ whole␈α∪ belief␈α∪structures␈α∪rather␈α∀than␈α∪ individual
␈↓ α∧␈↓beliefs.␈α⊃ We␈α⊃can␈α⊃ treat␈α⊃individual␈α⊃beliefs␈α⊃ by␈α⊃ saying␈α⊃ that␈α⊃a␈α⊃ system␈α⊃ believes␈α⊃ ␈↓↓p␈↓␈α⊃ in␈α⊃state␈α⊃ ␈↓↓s␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓provided␈αall␈α"reasonably␈αgood"␈α ␈↓↓B␈↓'s␈α
satisfy␈α␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓.␈α Thus␈α we␈αare␈αdistinguishing␈α
the␈α"intersection"
␈↓ α∧␈↓of the reasonably good ␈↓↓B␈↓'s.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ (An␈α∀analogy␈α∀with␈α∀cryptography␈α∀may␈α∀be␈α∪helpful.␈α∀ We␈α∀solve␈α∀a␈α∀cryptogram␈α∀by␈α∪making
␈↓ α∧␈↓hypotheses␈αabout␈αthe␈αstructure␈αof␈αthe␈αcipher␈αand␈αabout␈αthe␈αtranslation␈αof␈αparts␈αof␈αthe␈αcipher␈αtext.
␈↓ α∧␈↓Our␈α
solution␈α
is␈α
complete␈α
when␈α
we␈α
have␈α"guessed"␈α
a␈α
cipher␈α
system␈α
that␈α
produces␈α
the␈αcryptogram
␈↓ α∧␈↓from␈α∂a␈α∂plausible␈α∂plaintext␈α⊂message.␈α∂ Though␈α∂we␈α∂never␈α∂prove␈α⊂that␈α∂our␈α∂solution␈α∂is␈α⊂unique,␈α∂two
␈↓ α∧␈↓different␈αsolutions␈αare␈αalmost␈αnever␈αfound␈αexcept␈αfor␈αvery␈αshort␈αcryptograms.␈α In␈αthe␈αanalogy,␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓second␈αorder␈αdefinition␈α
β␈αcorresponds␈αto␈α
the␈αgeneral␈αidea␈α
of␈αencipherment,␈αand␈α
␈↓↓B␈↓␈αis␈αthe␈α
particular
␈↓ α∧␈↓system␈α
used.␈α∞ While␈α
we␈α∞will␈α
rarely␈α∞be␈α
able␈α∞to␈α
prove␈α∞uniqueness,␈α
we␈α∞don't␈α
expect␈α∞to␈α
find␈α∞two␈α
␈↓↓B␈↓s
␈↓ α∧␈↓both satisfying β).
␈↓ α∧␈↓ It␈α
seems␈α
to␈α
me␈α
that␈α
there␈αshould␈α
be␈α
a␈α
metatheorem␈α
of␈α
mathematical␈α
logic␈αasserting
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈α∞not␈α∞all␈α∞ second␈α∞order␈α∞definitions␈α∂can␈α∞ be␈α∞reduced␈α∞ to␈α∞ first␈α∞ order␈α∞definitions␈α∂ and␈α∞ further
␈↓ α∧␈↓theorems␈α∂characterizing␈α∂ those␈α∂ second␈α⊂ order␈α∂ definitions␈α∂ that␈α∂ admit␈α∂ such␈α⊂reductions.␈α∂ Such
␈↓ α∧␈↓technical␈α
results,␈α
if␈α
they␈α
can␈α
be␈α
found,␈α
may␈α
be␈α
helpful␈α
in␈α
philosophy␈α
and␈α
in␈α
the␈α
construction␈α
of
␈↓ α∧␈↓formal␈αscientific␈αtheories.␈α I␈αwould␈αconjecture␈αthat␈αmany␈αof␈αthe␈αinformal␈αphilosophical␈αarguments
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈α∩certain␈α∩mental␈α∩ concepts␈α∪cannot␈α∩be␈α∩reduced␈α∩to␈α∩ physics␈α∪will␈α∩turn␈α∩out␈α∩to␈α∩be␈α∪sketches␈α∩of
␈↓ α∧␈↓arguments that these concepts require second (or higher) order definitions.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|7␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Here␈α
is␈α
a␈α
deliberately␈α
imprecise␈α
second␈α
order␈αdefinition␈α
of␈α
belief.␈α
For␈α
each␈α
state␈α
␈↓↓s␈↓␈α
of␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓machine␈αand␈αeach␈α sentence␈α␈↓↓p␈↓␈αin␈α a␈αsuitable␈α language␈α␈↓↓L,␈αwe␈↓␈αassign␈αtruth␈αto␈α␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓␈αif␈αand␈αonly␈αif
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈αmachine␈αis␈α
considered␈αto␈αbelieve␈α␈↓↓p␈↓␈α
when␈αit␈α is␈α
in␈αstate␈α ␈↓↓s␈↓.␈α The␈α
language␈α ␈↓↓L␈↓␈αis␈α chosen␈α
for
␈↓ α∧␈↓our␈αconvenience,␈αand␈α there␈α
is␈αno␈αassumption␈α that␈α
the␈αmachine␈αexplicitly␈αrepresents␈α
sentences␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓L␈↓␈αin␈α
any␈αway.␈α
Thus␈αwe␈αcan␈α
talk␈αabout␈α
the␈αbeliefs␈αof␈α
Chinese,␈α dogs,␈α
corporations,␈α thermostats,
␈↓ α∧␈↓and␈α computer␈αoperating␈α systems␈α without␈αassuming␈α that␈α they␈αuse␈α English␈α or␈αour␈αfavorite␈α
first
␈↓ α∧␈↓order␈α
language.␈α∞ ␈↓↓L␈↓␈α
may␈α∞or␈α
may␈α∞not␈α
be␈α∞the␈α
language␈α∞be␈α
the␈α∞language␈α
we␈α∞are␈α
using␈α∞for␈α
making
␈↓ α∧␈↓other␈αassertions,␈αe.g.␈αwe␈αcould,␈αwriting␈αin␈αEnglish,␈αsystematically␈αuse␈αFrench␈αsentences␈αas␈αobjects␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓belief.␈α However,␈α the␈αbest␈αchoice␈α for␈αartificial␈α
intelligence␈α work␈αmay␈αbe␈αto␈α make␈α␈↓↓L␈↓␈αa␈α
subset␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓our "outer" language restricted so as to avoid the paradoxical self-references of (Montague 1963).
␈↓ α∧␈↓ We␈α∩now␈α∩subject␈α∩␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓␈α∩to␈α∩certain␈α∩criteria;␈α∩i.e.␈α∩β␈↓↓(B,W)␈↓␈α∩is␈α∩considered␈α∩true␈α∪provided␈α∩the
␈↓ α∧␈↓following conditions are satisfied:
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$1.1.␈α∂The␈α∂set␈α∂␈↓↓Bel(s)␈↓␈α∂of␈α∂beliefs,␈α∂i.e.␈α∂the␈α∂set␈α∂of␈α∂␈↓↓p␈↓'s␈α∂for␈α∂which␈α∂ ␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓␈α∂is␈α⊂ assigned␈α∂true
␈↓ α∧␈↓when ␈↓↓M␈↓ is in state ␈↓↓s␈↓ contains sufficiently "obvious" consequences of some of its members.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$1.2.␈α∂ ␈↓↓Bel(s)␈↓␈α∂changes␈α∂in␈α∂a␈α∂ reasonable␈α⊂ way␈α∂when␈α∂the␈α∂ state␈α∂changes␈α∂in␈α⊂time.␈α∂ We
␈↓ α∧␈↓like␈α⊃ new␈α⊃ beliefs␈α⊃ to␈α⊃ be␈α⊃ logical␈α⊃ or␈α∩ "plausible"␈α⊃consequences␈α⊃of␈α⊃old␈α⊃ones␈α⊃or␈α⊃to␈α⊃come␈α∩in␈α⊃as
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓communications␈↓␈α in␈α
some␈αlanguage␈α
on␈αthe␈αinput␈α
lines␈αor␈α
to␈αbe␈α␈↓↓observations␈↓,␈α
i.e.␈α beliefs␈α
about␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓environment␈αthe␈α
information␈αfor␈αwhich␈α
comes␈αin␈αon␈α
the␈αinput␈α
lines.␈α The␈αset␈α
of␈αbeliefs␈αshould␈α
not
␈↓ α∧␈↓change too rapidly as the state changes with time.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$1.3.␈α∂ We␈α⊂prefer␈α∂ the␈α∂set␈α⊂ of␈α∂beliefs␈α⊂ to␈α∂be␈α∂ as␈α⊂consistent␈α∂ as␈α⊂possible.␈α∂ (Admittedly,
␈↓ α∧␈↓consistency␈α is␈αnot␈αa␈αquantitative␈αconcept␈αin␈αmathematical␈αlogic␈α-␈α a␈αsystem␈αis␈α either␈αconsistent␈αor
␈↓ α∧␈↓not,␈α∂but␈α∂ it␈α∂would␈α∂seem␈α∂that␈α∂we␈α⊂ will␈α∂sometimes␈α∂have␈α∂to␈α∂ascribe␈α∂ inconsistent␈α∂sets␈α∂of␈α⊂beliefs␈α∂to
␈↓ α∧␈↓machines␈αand␈αpeople.␈α
Our␈αintuition␈αsays␈αthat␈α
we␈αshould␈αbe␈αable␈α
to␈αmaintain␈αareas␈αof␈α
consistency
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|8␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓in␈α
our␈αbeliefs␈α
and␈αthat␈α
it␈αmay␈α
be␈α especially␈α
important␈α to␈α
avoid␈α inconsistencies␈α
in␈α the␈α
machine's
␈↓ α∧␈↓purely analytic beliefs).
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$1.4.␈α∞ Our␈α∞criteria␈α∂for␈α∞belief␈α∞systems␈α∂can␈α∞be␈α∞strengthened␈α∞if␈α∂we␈α∞identify␈α∞some␈α∂of␈α∞the
␈↓ α∧␈↓machine's␈αbeliefs␈αas␈αexpressing␈αgoals,␈α i.e.␈α
if␈αwe␈αhave␈αbeliefs␈α of␈αthe␈α
form␈α"It␈αwould␈αbe␈αgood␈αif␈α
...".
␈↓ α∧␈↓Then␈αwe␈αcan␈αask␈αthat␈αthe␈αmachine's␈αbehavior␈α be␈αsomewhat␈α␈↓↓rational␈↓,␈αi.e.␈α ␈↓↓it␈αdoes␈αwhat␈α it␈α believes
␈↓ α∧␈↓↓will␈α
achieve␈αits␈α
goals␈↓.␈α
The␈α more␈α
of␈α
its␈αbehavior␈α
we␈α
can␈α account␈α
for␈α
in␈α this␈α
way,␈α
the␈αbetter␈α
we
␈↓ α∧␈↓will␈α
like␈α
␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓.␈α
We␈αalso␈α
would␈α
like␈α
to␈αaccount␈α
for␈α
internal␈α
state␈α
changes␈αas␈α
changes␈α
in␈α
belief␈αin␈α
so
␈↓ α∧␈↓far as this is reasonable.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$1.5.␈α If␈αthe␈α
machine␈αcommunicates,␈αi.e.␈α
emits␈αsentences␈αin␈α
some␈αlanguage␈α that␈α can␈α
be
␈↓ α∧␈↓interpreted␈α as␈α assertions,␈α questions␈α
and␈αcommands,␈αwe␈αwill␈αwant␈α
the␈αassertions␈αto␈αbe␈αamong␈α
its
␈↓ α∧␈↓beliefs␈α⊂unless␈α⊃we␈α⊂are␈α⊂ ascribing␈α⊃to␈α⊂it␈α⊃ a␈α⊂goal␈α⊂or␈α⊃ subgoal␈α⊂that␈α⊂involves␈α⊃ lying.␈α⊂ In␈α⊃general,␈α⊂its
␈↓ α∧␈↓communications should be such as it believes will achieve its goals.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$1.6.␈α Sometimes␈αwe␈αshall␈αwant␈αto␈αascribe␈αintrospective␈αbeliefs,␈αe.g.␈αa␈αbelief␈αthat␈αit␈αdoes
␈↓ α∧␈↓not know how to fly to Boston or even that it doesn't know what it wants in a certain situation.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$1.7.␈α
Finally,␈α∞we␈α
will␈α
prefer␈α∞a␈α
more␈α
economical␈α∞ascription␈α
␈↓↓B␈↓␈α
to␈α∞a␈α
less␈α∞economical␈α
one.
␈↓ α∧␈↓The␈α
fewer␈α
beliefs␈α
we␈α
ascribe␈α
and␈α
the␈α
less␈α
they␈α
change␈α
with␈α
state␈α
consistent␈α
with␈α
accounting␈α
for
␈↓ α∧␈↓the behavior and the internal state changes, the better we will like it.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ The␈α∂above␈α⊂ criteria␈α∂have␈α⊂ been␈α∂ formulated␈α∂somewhat␈α⊂ vaguely.␈α∂ This␈α⊂ would␈α∂be␈α⊂bad␈α∂if
␈↓ α∧␈↓there␈α
were␈α
widely␈α
different␈α
ascriptions␈α
of␈α
beliefs␈α
to␈α
a␈α
particular␈α
machine␈α
that␈α
all␈α
met␈αour␈α
criteria
␈↓ α∧␈↓or␈α⊂if␈α⊃the␈α⊂criteria␈α⊂allowed␈α⊃ ascriptions␈α⊂that␈α⊃ differed␈α⊂widely␈α⊂from␈α⊃ our␈α⊂intuitions.␈α⊃ My␈α⊂present
␈↓ α∧␈↓opinion␈α∩is␈α⊃that␈α∩more␈α∩thought␈α⊃will␈α∩make␈α⊃the␈α∩ criteria␈α∩somewhat␈α⊃more␈α∩precise␈α⊃ at␈α∩no␈α∩cost␈α⊃ in
␈↓ α∧␈↓applicability,␈αbut␈α
that␈α they␈α
␈↓↓should␈↓␈αstill␈α
remain␈α rather␈αvague,␈α
i.e.␈αwe␈α
shall␈αwant␈α
to␈αascribe␈αbelief␈α
in
␈↓ α∧␈↓a␈α⊂␈↓↓family␈↓␈α⊃of␈α⊂cases.␈α⊂ However,␈α⊃even␈α⊂at␈α⊂the␈α⊃present␈α⊂level␈α⊂of␈α⊃vagueness,␈α⊂there␈α⊂probably␈α⊃won't␈α⊂be
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε|9␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓radically␈α∞different␈α∞equally␈α∂"good"␈α∞ascriptions␈α∞of␈α∂belief␈α∞for␈α∞systems␈α∂of␈α∞practical␈α∞interest.␈α∂ If␈α∞there
␈↓ α∧␈↓were, we would notice unresolvable ambiguities in our ascriptions of belief to our acquaintances.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ While␈αwe␈αmay␈α
not␈αwant␈αto␈α
pin␈αdown␈αour␈α
general␈αidea␈αof␈α
belief␈αto␈αa␈α
single␈αaxiomatization,
␈↓ α∧␈↓we␈α
will␈αneed␈α
to␈αbuild␈α
precise␈α
axiomatizations␈αof␈α
belief␈αand␈α
other␈αmental␈α
qualities␈α
into␈αparticular
␈↓ α∧␈↓intelligent computer programs.
␈↓ α∧␈↓2. ␈↓αDefinitions relative to an approximate theory␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Certain␈α
concepts,␈α
e.g.␈α
␈↓↓X␈αcan␈α
do␈α
Y␈↓,␈α
are␈α
meaningful␈αonly␈α
in␈α
connection␈α
with␈α
a␈αrather␈α
complex
␈↓ α∧␈↓theory.␈α∂ For␈α∞ example,␈α∂ suppose␈α∂ we␈α∞denote␈α∂the␈α∂state␈α∞of␈α∂the␈α∞world␈α∂by␈α∂␈↓↓s␈↓,␈α∞and␈α∂suppose␈α∂we␈α∞have
␈↓ α∧␈↓functions␈α␈↓↓f␈↓β1␈↓↓(s)␈↓,...,␈↓↓f␈↓βn␈↓↓(s)␈↓␈α that␈α are␈α directly␈α or␈α indirectly␈αobservable.␈α Suppose␈αfurther␈αthat␈α␈↓↓F(s)␈↓␈αis
␈↓ α∧␈↓another function of the world-state but that we can approximate it by
␈↓ α∧␈↓ ␈↓↓F"(s) = F'(f␈↓β1␈↓↓(s),...,f␈↓βn␈↓↓(s))␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Now␈α consider␈α the␈αcounterfactual␈αconditional␈αsentence,␈α"If␈α␈↓↓f␈↓β2␈↓↓(s)␈↓␈αwere␈α4,␈αthen␈α␈↓↓F(s)␈↓␈αwould␈αbe
␈↓ α∧␈↓3␈α
-␈αcalling␈α
the␈αpresent␈α
state␈αof␈α
the␈αworld␈α
␈↓↓s␈↓β0␈↓."␈αBy␈α
itself,␈αthis␈α
sentence␈αhas␈α
no␈αmeaning,␈α
because␈αno
␈↓ α∧␈↓definite␈αstate␈α␈↓↓s␈↓␈αof␈αthe␈αworld␈αis␈α specified␈α by␈α the␈α condition.␈α However,␈αin␈αthe␈αframework␈αof␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓functions␈α∞␈↓↓f␈↓β1␈↓↓(s),...,f␈↓βn␈↓↓(s)␈↓␈α∞and␈α∞the␈α∞given␈α∞approximation␈α∞ to␈α∞␈↓↓F(s)␈↓,␈α∞ the␈α∞ assertion␈α∞ can␈α∞be␈α∞verified␈α
by
␈↓ α∧␈↓computing␈α␈↓↓F'␈↓␈αwith␈αall␈αarguments␈αexcept␈αthe␈αsecond␈αhaving␈αthe␈α values␈α associated␈α with␈α the␈αstate
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓s␈↓β0␈↓ of the world.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ This gives rise to some remarks:
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$2.1.␈α∩The␈α∩most␈α∩straightforward␈α∩case␈α∩of␈α∩counterfactuals␈α∩arises␈α∩when␈α∩the␈α∩state␈α∩of␈α∩a
␈↓ α∧␈↓phenomenon␈αhas␈αa␈αdistinguished␈αCartesian␈αproduct␈αstructure.␈α Then␈αthe␈αmeaning␈αof␈αa␈αchange␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓one␈αcomponent␈αwithout␈αchanging␈αthe␈αothers␈αis␈αquite␈αclear.␈α Changes␈αof␈αmore␈αthan␈αone␈αcomponent
␈↓ α∧␈↓also␈α∩have␈α∩definite␈α∩meanings.␈α∩ This␈α∩is␈α∩a␈α∩stronger␈α∩structure␈α∩than␈α∩the␈α∩␈↓↓possible␈α∩worlds␈↓␈α⊃structure
␈↓ α∧␈↓discussed in (Lewis 1973).
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu10␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$2.2.␈αThe␈αusual␈αcase␈αis␈αone␈αin␈αwhich␈αthe␈αstate␈α␈↓↓s␈↓␈αis␈αa␈αsubstantially␈αunknown␈αentity␈αand
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α
form␈αof␈α
the␈α
function␈α␈↓↓F␈↓␈α
is␈αalso␈α
unknown,␈α
but␈αthe␈α
values␈αof␈α
␈↓↓f␈↓β1␈↓↓(s),...,f␈↓βn␈↓↓(s)␈↓␈α
and␈αthe␈α
function␈α␈↓↓F'␈↓␈α
are
␈↓ α∧␈↓much␈α
better␈α
known.␈α
Suppose␈α
further␈αthat␈α
␈↓↓F"(s)␈↓␈α
is␈α
known␈α
to␈αbe␈α
only␈α
a␈α
fair␈α
approximation␈αto␈α
␈↓↓F(s)␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓We␈αnow␈αhave␈αa␈αsituation␈αin␈αwhich␈αthe␈αcounterfactual␈αconditional␈αstatement␈αis␈αmeaningful␈αas␈αlong
␈↓ α∧␈↓as␈α
it␈αis␈α
not␈α
examined␈αtoo␈α
closely,␈αi.e.␈α
as␈α
long␈αas␈α
we␈α
are␈αthinking␈α
of␈αthe␈α
world␈α
in␈αterms␈α
of␈αthe␈α
values
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈α∞␈↓↓f␈↓β1␈↓↓,...,f␈↓βn␈↓,␈α∂but␈α∞when␈α∞we␈α∂go␈α∞beyond␈α∞the␈α∂approximate␈α∞theory,␈α∞the␈α∂whole␈α∞meaning␈α∞of␈α∂the␈α∞sentence
␈↓ α∧␈↓seems to disintegrate.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Our␈α
idea␈α
is␈α
that␈α
this␈α
is␈α
a␈α
very␈α
common␈α
phenomenon.␈α
In␈α
particular␈α
it␈α
applies␈α
to␈α
statements␈α
of
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈αform␈α␈↓↓"X␈αcan␈αdo␈αY"␈↓.␈α Such␈αstatements␈αcan␈αbe␈αgiven␈αa␈αprecise␈αmeaning␈αin␈αterms␈αof␈αa␈α
system␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓interacting␈α⊂automata␈α⊃as␈α⊂is␈α⊃discussed␈α⊂in␈α⊃detail␈α⊂in␈α⊃(McCarthy␈α⊂and␈α⊃Hayes␈α⊂1970).␈α⊃ We␈α⊂determine
␈↓ α∧␈↓whether␈αAutomaton␈α1␈αcan␈αput␈αAutomaton␈α3␈αin␈αstate␈α5␈αat␈αtime␈α10␈αby␈αanswering␈αa␈α
question␈αabout
␈↓ α∧␈↓an␈αautomaton␈α
system␈αin␈α
which␈αthe␈α
outputs␈αfrom␈α
Automaton␈α1␈α
are␈αreplaced␈α
by␈αinputs␈αfrom␈α
outside
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α
system.␈α
Namely,␈α
we␈αask␈α
whether␈α
there␈α
is␈αa␈α
sequence␈α
of␈α
inputs␈αto␈α
the␈α
new␈α
system␈α
that␈α␈↓↓would␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓put␈αAutomaton␈α3␈αin␈αstate␈α5␈αat␈αtime␈α10;␈αif␈αyes,␈αwe␈αsay␈αthat␈αAutomaton␈α1␈α␈↓↓could␈↓␈αdo␈αit␈αin␈αthe␈αoriginal
␈↓ α∧␈↓system␈α∂even␈α∞though␈α∂we␈α∞may␈α∂be␈α∞able␈α∂to␈α∞show␈α∂that␈α∞it␈α∂won't␈α∞emit␈α∂the␈α∞necessary␈α∂outputs.␈α∂ In␈α∞that
␈↓ α∧␈↓paper, we argue that this definition corresponds to the intuitive notion of ␈↓↓X can do Y.␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ What␈α
was␈α
not␈αnoted␈α
in␈α
that␈α
paper␈αis␈α
that␈α
modelling␈α
the␈αsituation␈α
by␈α
the␈α
particular␈αsystem␈α
of
␈↓ α∧␈↓interacting␈α⊃automata␈α⊃is␈α⊃an␈α⊃approximation,␈α⊃and␈α⊃the␈α⊃sentences␈α⊃involving␈α⊃␈↓↓can␈↓␈α⊃derived␈α⊃from␈α⊂the
␈↓ α∧␈↓approximation cannot necessarily be translated into single assertions about the real world.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ I␈α∞contend␈α∞ that␈α∞the␈α∞statement,␈α∞ ␈↓↓"I␈α∞can␈α∞go␈α∞ skiing␈α∞tomorrow,␈α∞but␈α∞I␈α∞don't␈α∞intend␈α∞to,␈α∂because␈α∞I
␈↓ α∧␈↓↓want to finish this paper"␈↓ has the following properties:
␈↓ α∧␈↓ 1.␈αIt␈α
has␈αa␈α
precise␈αmeaning␈α
in␈αa␈αcertain␈α
approximate␈αtheory␈α
of␈αthe␈α
world␈αin␈α
which␈αI␈αand␈α
my
␈↓ α∧␈↓environment are considered as collections of interacting automata.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu11␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓ 2.␈αIt␈αcannot␈αbe␈αdirectly␈αinterpreted␈αas␈αa␈αstatement␈αabout␈αthe␈αworld␈αitself,␈αbecause␈αit␈αcan't␈αbe
␈↓ α∧␈↓stated␈α∞in␈α∞what␈α
total␈α∞configurations␈α∞of␈α
the␈α∞world␈α∞the␈α
success␈α∞of␈α∞my␈α
attempt␈α∞to␈α∞go␈α
skiing␈α∞is␈α∞to␈α
be
␈↓ α∧␈↓validated.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ 3.␈α∃The␈α∀approximate␈α∃theory␈α∀within␈α∃which␈α∀the␈α∃statement␈α∀is␈α∃meaningful␈α∀may␈α∃have␈α∀an
␈↓ α∧␈↓objectively␈α
preferred␈αstatus␈α
in␈α
that␈αit␈α
may␈αbe␈α
the␈α
only␈αtheory␈α
not␈αenormously␈α
more␈α
complex␈αthat
␈↓ α∧␈↓enables my actions and mental states to be predicted.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ 4. The statement may convey useful information.
␈↓ α∧␈↓Our␈α⊃conclusion␈α⊃is␈α∩that␈α⊃the␈α⊃statement␈α∩is␈α⊃␈↓αtrue␈↓,␈α⊃but␈α∩in␈α⊃a␈α⊃sense␈α∩that␈α⊃depends␈α⊃essentially␈α∩on␈α⊃the
␈↓ α∧␈↓approximate␈α∂theory,␈α∞and␈α∂that␈α∂this␈α∞intellectual␈α∂situation␈α∞is␈α∂normal␈α∂and␈α∞should␈α∂be␈α∂accepted.␈α∞ We
␈↓ α∧␈↓further␈α⊃conclude␈α⊃that␈α⊃the␈α⊃old-fashioned␈α⊃common-sense␈α⊃analysis␈α⊃of␈α⊃a␈α⊃personality␈α⊃into␈α⊃␈↓↓will␈↓␈α⊂and
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓intellect␈↓␈α
and␈α
other␈α
components␈α
may␈αbe␈α
valid␈α
and␈α
might␈α
be␈αput␈α
on␈α
a␈α
precise␈α
scientific␈αfooting␈α
using
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓definitions relative to an approximate theory␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu12␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ βjEXAMPLES OF SYSTEMS WITH MENTAL QUALITIES
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Let␈α⊂us␈α⊂ consider␈α⊂some␈α⊂ examples␈α⊂of␈α⊃machines␈α⊂ and␈α⊂programs␈α⊂ to␈α⊂which␈α⊂we␈α⊃may␈α⊂ascribe
␈↓ α∧␈↓belief and goal structures.
␈↓ α∧␈↓1.␈α∃ ␈↓αThermostats.␈↓␈α∃ Ascribing␈α∃beliefs␈α∃to␈α∃simple␈α∃thermostats␈α∃is␈α∃unnecessary␈α∃for␈α∃the␈α∃study␈α∀of
␈↓ α∧␈↓thermostats,␈α⊃because␈α⊂their␈α⊃operation␈α⊂can␈α⊃be␈α⊃well␈α⊂ understood␈α⊃without␈α⊂it.␈α⊃ However,␈α⊃their␈α⊂very
␈↓ α∧␈↓simplicity␈α∞ makes␈α∞it␈α∞clearer␈α∞what␈α∞is␈α∞involved␈α∞ in␈α∞the␈α∞ ascription,␈α∞and␈α∞ we␈α∞maintain␈α∞(partly␈α∞ as␈α
a
␈↓ α∧␈↓provocation␈α∩to␈α∩ those␈α∩who␈α∩ regard␈α∩ attribution␈α⊃of␈α∩ beliefs␈α∩ to␈α∩machines␈α∩ as␈α∩mere␈α⊃ intellectual
␈↓ α∧␈↓sloppiness) that the ascription is legitimate.␈↓∧6␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ First␈α⊂ consider␈α⊂a␈α⊂simple␈α⊂ thermostat␈α⊂that␈α⊃turns␈α⊂off␈α⊂the␈α⊂heat␈α⊂when␈α⊂the␈α⊂ temperature␈α⊃is␈α⊂a
␈↓ α∧␈↓degree␈α
above␈α
the␈αtemperature␈α
set␈α
on␈α
the␈αthermostat,␈α
turns␈α
on␈α
the␈αheat␈α
when␈α
the␈αtemperature␈α
is
␈↓ α∧␈↓a␈αdegree␈α
below␈αthe␈αdesired␈α
temperature,␈αand␈αleaves␈α
the␈αheat␈α
as␈α is␈αwhen␈α
the␈αtemperature␈α is␈α
in
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α
two␈α
degree␈α
range␈α around␈α
the␈α
desired␈α
temperature.␈αThe␈α
simplest␈α
belief␈α
predicate␈α␈↓↓B(s,p)␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ascribes␈αbelief␈αto␈αonly␈αthree␈αsentences:␈α "The␈αroom␈αis␈αtoo␈αcold",␈α"The␈αroom␈αis␈α too␈αhot",␈αand␈α"The
␈↓ α∧␈↓room␈αis␈αOK"␈α-␈αthe␈α
beliefs␈αbeing␈αassigned␈αto␈αstates␈αof␈α
the␈αthermostat␈αin␈αthe␈αobvious␈α
way.␈α When
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α
thermostat␈α
believes␈α
the␈α∞ room␈α
is␈α
too␈α
cold␈α∞ or␈α
too␈α
hot,␈α
it␈α
sends␈α∞ a␈α
message␈α
saying␈α
so␈α∞to␈α
the
␈↓ α∧␈↓furnace.␈α∞A␈α∞slightly␈α∞more␈α∞complex␈α∞belief␈α∂predicate␈α∞could␈α∞also␈α∞ be␈α∞used␈α∞in␈α∞ which␈α∂the␈α∞thermostat
␈↓ α∧␈↓has␈αa␈α belief␈αabout␈α
what␈αthe␈αtemperature␈αshould␈αbe␈α
and␈αanother␈αbelief␈αabout␈α
what␈αit␈αis.␈α It␈αis␈α
not
␈↓ α∧␈↓clear␈α
which␈α
is␈α
better,␈α
but␈α
if␈α
we␈α
wished␈αto␈α
consider␈α
possible␈α
errors␈α
in␈α
the␈α
thermometer,␈α
then␈αwe
␈↓ α∧␈↓would␈αascribe␈αbeliefs␈α about␈αwhat␈αthe␈αtemperature␈αis.␈αWe␈α do␈αnot␈αascribe␈αto␈α it␈αany␈αother␈α beliefs;
␈↓ α∧␈↓it␈αhas␈α no␈αopinion␈αeven␈α about␈αwhether␈αthe␈αheat␈αis␈αon␈αor␈αoff␈αor␈αabout␈αthe␈αweather␈αor␈αabout␈αwho
␈↓ α∧␈↓won␈αthe␈αbattle␈αof␈αWaterloo.␈α Moreover,␈αit␈α has␈α no␈αintrospective␈α beliefs,␈α i.e.␈α it␈α
doesn't␈αbelieve
␈↓ α∧␈↓that it believes the room is too hot.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ The␈α∞temperature␈α∞control␈α∞system␈α∞in␈α∞ my␈α∞house␈α∞may␈α∞be␈α∞ described␈α∞as␈α∂ follows:␈α∞Thermostats
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu13␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓upstairs␈αand␈α downstairs␈α
tell␈αthe␈α central␈α
system␈α to␈αturn␈α on␈α
or␈αshut␈α off␈α
hot␈α water␈αflow␈α to␈α
these
␈↓ α∧␈↓areas.␈α A␈αcentral␈αwater-temperature␈αthermostat␈αtells␈αthe␈αfurnace␈αto␈αturn␈α on␈αor␈αoff␈α thus␈α keeping
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α central␈α hot␈α water␈α reservoir␈αat␈α the␈α right␈αtemperture.␈α Recently␈αit␈αwas␈αtoo␈αhot␈αupstairs,␈αand
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α⊂question␈α⊂arose␈α⊃as␈α⊂to␈α⊂whether␈α⊃the␈α⊂upstairs␈α⊂thermostat␈α⊂mistakenly␈α⊃ ␈↓↓believed␈↓␈α⊂it␈α⊂was␈α⊃too␈α⊂ cold
␈↓ α∧␈↓upstairs␈α∞ or␈α
whether␈α∞ the␈α
furnace␈α∞ thermostat␈α∞ mistakenly␈α
␈↓↓believed␈α∞␈↓␈α
the␈α∞ water␈α
was␈α∞too␈α∞ cold.␈α
It
␈↓ α∧␈↓turned␈αout␈αthat␈α neither␈αmistake␈αwas␈αmade;␈αthe␈αdownstairs␈αcontroller␈α␈↓↓tried␈↓␈αto␈αturn␈αoff␈αthe␈αflow␈α of
␈↓ α∧␈↓water␈α⊂but␈α∂ ␈↓↓couldn't␈↓,␈α⊂because␈α∂the␈α⊂ valve␈α∂was␈α⊂ stuck.␈α∂ The␈α⊂plumber␈α∂came␈α⊂ once␈α∂ and␈α⊂found␈α∂ the
␈↓ α∧␈↓trouble,␈α∩ and␈α∩ came␈α∪again␈α∩ when␈α∩ a␈α∪replacement␈α∩valve␈α∩ was␈α∪ordered.␈α∩ Since␈α∩the␈α∪services␈α∩of
␈↓ α∧␈↓plumbers␈α
are␈α
increasingly␈α
expensive,␈α
and␈α
microcomputers␈α
are␈α
increasingly␈α
cheap,␈α
one␈α
is␈α
led␈αto
␈↓ α∧␈↓design␈α
a␈α
temperature␈α
control␈α
system␈α
that␈α
would␈α
␈↓↓know␈↓␈α
a␈α
lot␈α
more␈α
about␈α
the␈α
thermal␈α
state␈α∞of␈α
the
␈↓ α∧␈↓house and its own state of health.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ In␈αthe␈αfirst␈α place,␈αwhile␈αthe␈α system␈α␈↓↓couldn't␈↓␈αturn␈α off␈αthe␈αflow␈αof␈αhot␈αwater␈α upstairs,␈αthere
␈↓ α∧␈↓is␈α∞no␈α
reason␈α∞ to␈α
ascribe␈α∞to␈α
it␈α∞the␈α
␈↓↓knowledge␈↓␈α∞that␈α
it␈α∞couldn't,␈α
and␈α∞ ␈↓↓a␈α
fortiori␈↓␈α∞it␈α
had␈α∞no␈α∞ability␈α
to
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓communicate␈↓␈α∂this␈α∂␈↓↓fact␈↓␈α∂ or␈α∂to␈α∂take␈α∂it␈α∂into␈α∂ account␈α∂in␈α∂controlling␈α∂the␈α∂system.␈α∂ A␈α⊂more␈α∂advanced
␈↓ α∧␈↓system␈α∪would␈α∪know␈α∪whether␈α∩the␈α∪ ␈↓↓actions␈↓␈α∪it␈α∪␈↓↓attempted␈↓␈α∩succeeded,␈α∪and␈α∪it␈α∪would␈α∩communicate
␈↓ α∧␈↓failures␈αand␈αadapt␈α to␈α
them.␈α (We␈α adapted␈αto␈α
the␈αfailure␈α by␈αturning␈α
off␈α the␈αwhole␈α system␈α
until
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α∞ whole␈α∂ house␈α∞cooled␈α∂ off␈α∞and␈α∂ then␈α∞letting␈α∂the␈α∞two␈α∂parts␈α∞warm␈α∂up␈α∞ together.␈α∂ The␈α∞present
␈↓ α∧␈↓system has the ␈↓↓physical capability␈↓ of doing this even if it hasn't the ␈↓↓knowledge␈↓ or the ␈↓↓will␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓2.␈α∂␈↓αSelf-reproducing␈α⊂ intelligent␈α∂ configurations␈α⊂ in␈α∂ a␈α∂ cellular␈α⊂automaton␈α∂world.␈↓␈α⊂ A␈α∂␈↓↓cellular␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓automaton␈↓␈α
system␈α
assigns␈α
to␈α
each␈α
vertex␈α
in␈α
a␈α
certain␈α
graph␈α
a␈α
finite␈α
automaton.␈α
The␈α
state␈αof␈α
each
␈↓ α∧␈↓automaton␈α
at␈α
time␈α
␈↓↓t+1␈↓␈α
depends␈α
on␈αits␈α
state␈α
at␈α
time␈α
␈↓↓t␈↓␈α
and␈αthe␈α
states␈α
of␈α
its␈α
neighbors␈α
at␈α
time␈α␈↓↓t␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓The␈αmost␈αcommon␈αgraph␈αis␈αthe␈αarray␈αof␈αpoints␈α␈↓↓(x,y)␈↓␈αin␈αthe␈αplane␈αwith␈αinteger␈αco-ordinates␈α␈↓↓x␈↓␈αand
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu14␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓y.␈↓␈α∩ The␈α∩first␈α∩ use␈α∩of␈α⊃cellular␈α∩automata␈α∩was␈α∩by␈α∩von␈α⊃Neumann␈α∩(196?)␈α∩who␈α∩found␈α∩a␈α∩27␈α⊃state
␈↓ α∧␈↓automaton␈α∩that␈α∩could␈α∩be␈α∩used␈α∩to␈α∩ construct␈α∩ self-reproducing␈α∩configuration␈α∩ that␈α∩ were␈α∩ also
␈↓ α∧␈↓universal␈α computers.␈α
The␈α basic␈α
automaton␈αin␈α
von␈αNeumann's␈α
system␈αhad␈α
a␈αdistinguished␈α
state
␈↓ α∧␈↓called␈α
0␈α
and␈α
a␈α
point␈α∞in␈α
state␈α
0␈α
whose␈α
four␈α
neighbors␈α∞were␈α
also␈α
in␈α
that␈α
state␈α
would␈α∞remain␈α
in
␈↓ α∧␈↓state␈α0.␈α The␈αinitial␈αconfigurations␈α considered␈α had␈αall␈α but␈α a␈α finite␈α number␈αof␈αcells␈αin␈α
state␈α0,
␈↓ α∧␈↓and,␈α
of␈α
course,␈α
this␈α∞property␈α
would␈α
persist␈α
although␈α
the␈α∞number␈α
of␈α
non-zero␈α
cells␈α∞ might␈α
grow
␈↓ α∧␈↓indefinitely with time.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ The␈α∞ self-reproducing␈α∞ system␈α∞used␈α∞the␈α∞states␈α∞of␈α∞a␈α∞long␈α∞strip␈α∞of␈α∞non-zero␈α∞cells␈α∞as␈α∞a␈α∞"tape"
␈↓ α∧␈↓containing␈αinstructions␈αto␈αa␈α"universal␈αconstructor"␈α configuration␈α that␈α would␈α construct␈α a␈α copy
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈α
the␈αconfiguration␈α
to␈αbe␈α
reproduced␈αbut␈α
with␈α
each␈αcell␈α
in␈αa␈α
passive␈α state␈α
that␈α
would␈α persist
␈↓ α∧␈↓as␈α long␈α
as␈αits␈αneighbors␈α
were␈αalso␈αin␈α
passive␈αstates.␈α
After␈αthe␈αconstruction␈α
phase,␈αthe␈αtape␈α
would
␈↓ α∧␈↓be␈α∞ copied␈α∞ to␈α∞make␈α∞ the␈α∞ tape␈α∞for␈α∞the␈α∞new␈α∞machine,␈α∞and␈α∞then␈α∞the␈α∞new␈α∞system␈α∞would␈α∞be␈α∞set␈α∞in
␈↓ α∧␈↓motion␈α
by␈α
activating␈α
one␈α
of␈α
its␈α
cells.␈α
The␈α
new␈α
system␈α
would␈α
then␈α
move␈α
away␈α
from␈α
its␈αmother
␈↓ α∧␈↓and␈α
the␈α
process␈α
would␈α
start␈α
over.␈α
The␈α
purpose␈α
of␈α
the␈α
design␈α
was␈α
to␈α
demonstrate␈α
that␈α
arbitrarily
␈↓ α∧␈↓complex␈α⊃configurations␈α⊃ could␈α⊃ be␈α⊃ self-reproducing␈α∩ -␈α⊃ the␈α⊃ complexity␈α⊃being␈α⊃assured␈α∩by␈α⊃also
␈↓ α∧␈↓requiring that they be universal computers.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Since␈α_von␈α_Neumann's␈α_time,␈α_simpler␈α_basic␈α_cells␈α_admitting␈α→self-reproducing␈α_universal
␈↓ α∧␈↓computers␈α∞have␈α∞been␈α∞discovered.␈α∂ The␈α∞simplest␈α∞so␈α∞far␈α∞is␈α∂the␈α∞two␈α∞state␈α∞Life␈α∞automaton␈α∂of␈α∞John
␈↓ α∧␈↓Conway␈α(196?).␈α The␈αstate␈αof␈αa␈αcell␈α
at␈αtime␈α␈↓↓t+1␈↓␈αis␈αdetermined␈αits␈αstate␈α
at␈αtime␈α␈↓↓t␈↓␈αand␈αthe␈αstates␈αof␈α
its
␈↓ α∧␈↓eight␈αneighbors␈αat␈αtime␈α␈↓↓t.␈↓␈α Namely,␈αa␈αpoint␈αwhose␈αstate␈αis␈α0␈αwill␈αchange␈αto␈αstate␈α1␈αif␈αexactly␈αthree
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈α
its␈α
neighbors␈αare␈α
in␈α
state␈α1.␈α
A␈α
point␈αwhose␈α
state␈α
is␈α
1␈αwill␈α
remain␈α
in␈αstate␈α
1␈α
if␈αtwo␈α
or␈α
three␈αof␈α
its
␈↓ α∧␈↓neighbors are in state 1. In all other cases the state becomes or remains 0.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Conway's␈αinitial␈αintent␈αwas␈αto␈αmodel␈αa␈αbirth␈αand␈αdeath␈αprocess␈αwhereby␈αa␈αcell␈αis␈αborn␈α(goes
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu15␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓into␈αstate␈α1)␈αif␈αit␈αhas␈α
the␈αright␈αnumber␈αof␈αliving␈αneighbors␈α
(namely␈αthree)␈αand␈αdies␈αif␈αit␈α
is␈αeither
␈↓ α∧␈↓too␈α⊂lonely␈α⊂(has␈α⊂none␈α⊂or␈α⊂one␈α⊂neighbor␈α⊂in␈α⊂state␈α⊂1)␈α⊂or␈α⊂is␈α⊂overcrowded␈α⊂(has␈α⊂four␈α⊂or␈α⊂more␈α∂living
␈↓ α∧␈↓neighbors).␈α∞ He␈α∞also␈α∞asked␈α∞whether␈α∞infinitely␈α∞growing␈α∞configurations␈α∞were␈α∞possible,␈α∞and␈α∞Gosper
␈↓ α∧␈↓first␈αproved␈αthat␈αthere␈αwere.␈α Surprisingly,␈α
it␈αturned␈αout␈αthat␈αself-reproducing␈αuniversal␈α
computers
␈↓ α∧␈↓could be built up as Life configurations.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Consider␈α⊃a␈α⊃number␈α⊃of␈α⊃such␈α⊃self-reproducing␈α⊃universal␈α⊃computers␈α⊃operating␈α⊃in␈α⊃the␈α⊃Life
␈↓ α∧␈↓plane,␈αand␈α
suppose␈αthat␈α
they␈αhave␈α
been␈αprogrammed␈αto␈α
study␈αthe␈α
properties␈αof␈α
their␈αworld␈αand␈α
to
␈↓ α∧␈↓communicate␈α∪among␈α∪themselves␈α∪about␈α∪it,␈α∩perhaps␈α∪pursuing␈α∪various␈α∪goals␈α∪co-operatively␈α∩and
␈↓ α∧␈↓competitively.␈α∞ Call␈α
these␈α∞configurations␈α∞robots.␈α
In␈α∞some␈α∞respects␈α
their␈α∞intellectual␈α∞and␈α
scientific
␈↓ α∧␈↓problems␈αwill␈αbe␈αlike␈αours,␈αbut␈αin␈αone␈αmajor␈αrespect␈αthey␈αlive␈αin␈αa␈αsimpler␈αworld␈αthan␈αours␈αseems
␈↓ α∧␈↓to␈αbe.␈α Namely,␈αthe␈αfundamental␈αphysics␈αof␈αtheir␈αworld␈αis␈αthat␈αof␈αthe␈αlife␈αautomaton,␈αand␈αthere␈αis
␈↓ α∧␈↓no␈αobstacle␈αto␈αeach␈αrobot␈α␈↓↓knowing␈↓␈αthis␈αphysics,␈αand␈αbeing␈αable␈αto␈αsimulate␈αthe␈αevolution␈αof␈αa␈αlife
␈↓ α∧␈↓configuration␈α
given␈α
the␈α
initial␈α
state.␈α
Moreover,␈α
if␈α
the␈α
initial␈α
state␈α
of␈α
the␈α
robot␈α
world␈α
is␈α∞finite␈α
it
␈↓ α∧␈↓can␈α
have␈αbeen␈α
recorded␈αin␈α
each␈α
robot␈αin␈α
the␈αbeginning␈α
or␈αelse␈α
recorded␈α
on␈αa␈α
strip␈αof␈α
cells␈αthat␈α
the
␈↓ α∧␈↓robots␈α⊂can␈α⊃read.␈α⊂ (The␈α⊂infinite␈α⊃regress␈α⊂of␈α⊂having␈α⊃to␈α⊂describe␈α⊂the␈α⊃description␈α⊂is␈α⊂avoided␈α⊃by␈α⊂a
␈↓ α∧␈↓convention␈α
that␈α
the␈α
description␈α
is␈α
not␈α
separately␈α
described,␈α
but␈α
can␈α
be␈α
read␈α
␈↓↓both␈↓␈α
as␈α
a␈αdescription␈α
of
␈↓ α∧␈↓the world ␈↓↓and␈↓ as a description of itself.)
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Since␈α∂these␈α∂robots␈α∞know␈α∂the␈α∂initial␈α∞state␈α∂of␈α∂their␈α∞world␈α∂and␈α∂its␈α∞laws␈α∂of␈α∂motion,␈α∂they␈α∞can
␈↓ α∧␈↓simulate␈α∪as␈α∩much␈α∪of␈α∪their␈α∩world's␈α∪history␈α∩as␈α∪they␈α∪want,␈α∩assuming␈α∪that␈α∩each␈α∪can␈α∪grow␈α∩into
␈↓ α∧␈↓unoccupied␈α∞space␈α∞so␈α∞as␈α∞to␈α∞have␈α∞memory␈α∞to␈α∞store␈α∞the␈α∞states␈α∞of␈α∞the␈α∞world␈α∞being␈α∞simulated.␈α
This
␈↓ α∧␈↓simulation␈α
is␈αnecessarily␈α
much␈αslower␈α
than␈αreal␈α
time,␈αso␈α
they␈αcan␈α
never␈αcatch␈α
up␈αwith␈α
the␈αpresent␈α
-
␈↓ α∧␈↓let␈α∀alone␈α∀predict␈α∪the␈α∀future.␈α∀ This␈α∪is␈α∀clear␈α∀if␈α∪we␈α∀imagine␈α∀the␈α∪simulation␈α∀carried␈α∀out␈α∀in␈α∪a
␈↓ α∧␈↓straightforwardly␈α
by␈α
updating␈α
a␈α
list␈α
of␈α
currently␈α
active␈α
cells␈α
in␈α
the␈α
simulated␈α
world␈α
according␈αto
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu16␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈αLife␈αrule,␈αbut␈αit␈αalso␈αapplies␈αto␈αany␈αclever␈αmathematical␈αmethod␈αthat␈αmight␈αpredict␈αmillions␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓steps␈αahead.␈α (Some␈α
Life␈αconfigurations,␈αe.g.␈αstatic␈α
ones␈αor␈αones␈α
containing␈αsingle␈α␈↓↓gliders␈↓␈αor␈α
␈↓↓cannon␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓can␈α∀have␈α∀their␈α∀distant␈α∃futures␈α∀predicted␈α∀with␈α∀little␈α∃computing.)␈α∀ Namely,␈α∀if␈α∀there␈α∃were␈α∀an
␈↓ α∧␈↓algorithm␈αfor␈αsuch␈αprediction,␈αa␈αrobot␈αcould␈αbe␈αmade␈αthat␈αwould␈αpredict␈αits␈αown␈αfuture␈αand␈αthen
␈↓ α∧␈↓disobey␈α
the␈α
prediction.␈α
The␈α∞detailed␈α
proof␈α
would␈α
be␈α
analogous␈α∞to␈α
the␈α
proof␈α
of␈α∞unsolvability␈α
of
␈↓ α∧␈↓the halting problem for Turing machines.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Now␈α
we␈αcome␈α
to␈α
the␈αpoint␈α
of␈α
this␈αlong␈α
disquisition.␈α
Suppose␈αwe␈α
wish␈α
to␈αprogram␈α
a␈αrobot␈α
to
␈↓ α∧␈↓be␈αsuccessful␈αin␈αthe␈αLife␈αworld␈αin␈αcompetition␈αor␈αco-operation␈αwith␈αthe␈αothers.␈α Without␈αany␈αidea
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈αhow␈αto␈αgive␈αa␈αmathematical␈αproof,␈αI␈αwill␈αclaim␈αthat␈αour␈αrobot␈αwill␈αneed␈αprograms␈α
that␈αascribe
␈↓ α∧␈↓purposes␈α∞and␈α
beliefs␈α∞to␈α
its␈α∞fellow␈α
robots␈α∞and␈α
predict␈α∞how␈α
they␈α∞will␈α
react␈α∞to␈α
its␈α∞ own␈α∞actions␈α
by
␈↓ α∧␈↓assuming␈α∂that␈α∂␈↓↓they␈α∂will␈α∂act␈α∂in␈α∂ways␈α∂that␈α∂they␈α∂believe␈α∂will␈α∂achieve␈α∂their␈α∂goals␈↓.␈α∂ Our␈α∂robot␈α∂might
␈↓ α∧␈↓acquire␈α∞these␈α∞mental␈α∞theories␈α∞in␈α∞several␈α∞ways:␈α
First,␈α∞we␈α∞might␈α∞design␈α∞the␈α∞universal␈α∞machine␈α
so
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈α
they␈α∞are␈α
present␈α∞in␈α
the␈α∞initial␈α
configuration␈α
of␈α∞the␈α
world.␈α∞ Second,␈α
we␈α∞might␈α
program␈α∞it␈α
to
␈↓ α∧␈↓acquire␈αthis␈αideas␈αby␈αinduction␈αfrom␈αits␈αexperience␈αand␈αeven␈αtransmit␈αthem␈αto␈αothers␈αthrough␈αan
␈↓ α∧␈↓"educational␈αsystem".␈α Third,␈αit␈αmight␈αderive␈αthe␈αpsychological␈αlaws␈αfrom␈αthe␈αfundamental␈αphysics
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈α∞the␈α∂world␈α∞and␈α∂its␈α∞knowledge␈α∂of␈α∞the␈α∂initial␈α∞configuration,␈α∂and␈α∞finally,␈α∂it␈α∞might␈α∂discover␈α∞how
␈↓ α∧␈↓robots are built from Life cells by doing experimental "biology".
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Knowing␈α⊂the␈α⊃Life␈α⊂ physics␈α⊂without␈α⊃some␈α⊂information␈α⊂ about␈α⊃the␈α⊂initial␈α⊃configuration␈α⊂is
␈↓ α∧␈↓insufficient␈α⊂to␈α⊃derive␈α⊂the␈α⊂␈↓↓psychological␈↓␈α⊃laws,␈α⊂because␈α⊃ robots␈α⊂can␈α⊂ be␈α⊃constructed␈α⊂ in␈α⊃the␈α⊂ Life
␈↓ α∧␈↓world␈α
in␈α
an␈αinfinity␈α
of␈α
ways.␈α This␈α
follows␈α
from␈αthe␈α
"folk␈α
theorem"␈αthat␈α
the␈α
Life␈α
automaton␈α is
␈↓ α∧␈↓universal␈αin␈αthe␈αsense␈α that␈αany␈αcellular␈αautomaton␈αcan␈αbe␈αconstructed␈αby␈αtaking␈αsufficiently␈αlarge
␈↓ α∧␈↓squares of Life cells as the basic cell of the other automaton.␈↓∧7␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Our␈αown␈αintellectual␈αposition␈αis␈αmore␈αdifficult␈αthan␈αthat␈αof␈αthe␈αLife␈αrobots.␈α We␈αdon't␈α
know
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu17␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈αfundamental␈αphysics␈α
of␈αour␈αworld,␈αand␈α
we␈αcan't␈αeven␈αbe␈α
sure␈αthat␈αits␈αfundamental␈α
physics␈αis
␈↓ α∧␈↓describable␈α∂in␈α∂finite␈α⊂terms.␈α∂ Even␈α∂if␈α∂we␈α⊂knew␈α∂the␈α∂physical␈α∂laws,␈α⊂they␈α∂seem␈α∂to␈α⊂preclude␈α∂precise
␈↓ α∧␈↓knowledge␈α∞of␈α
an␈α∞initial␈α∞state␈α
and␈α∞precise␈α∞calculation␈α
of␈α∞its␈α∞future␈α
both␈α∞for␈α∞quantum␈α
mechanical
␈↓ α∧␈↓reasons␈αand␈αbecause␈αthe␈αcontinuous␈αfunctions␈α
needed␈αto␈αrepresent␈αfields␈αcan't␈αseem␈αto␈α
involve␈αan
␈↓ α∧␈↓in inite amount of information.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ One␈α∂point␈α∞of␈α∂the␈α∂cellular␈α∞automaton␈α∂robot␈α∂ example␈α∞is␈α∂to␈α∂make␈α∞plausible␈α∂ the␈α∂idea␈α∞ that
␈↓ α∧␈↓much␈α
of␈αhuman␈α
mental␈α
structure␈αis␈α
not␈α
an␈αaccident␈α
of␈α
evolution␈α or␈α
even␈α
of␈α the␈α
physics␈αof␈α
our
␈↓ α∧␈↓world,␈α∂but␈α∂ is␈α⊂required␈α∂for␈α∂successful␈α⊂problem␈α∂solving␈α∂behavior␈α∂and␈α⊂must␈α∂be␈α∂designed␈α⊂into␈α∂or
␈↓ α∧␈↓evolved by any system that exhibits such behavior.
␈↓ α∧␈↓3.␈α⊃␈↓αComputer␈α⊃time-sharing␈α⊂systems.␈↓␈α⊃ These␈α⊃complicated␈α⊂computer␈α⊃programs␈α⊃allocate␈α⊂computer
␈↓ α∧␈↓time␈α
and␈α
other␈α
resources␈α
among␈α
users.␈α
They␈α
allow␈α
each␈α
user␈α
of␈α
the␈α
computer␈α
to␈α
behave␈αas␈α
though
␈↓ α∧␈↓he␈α
had␈α
a␈α
computer␈α
of␈α
his␈α
own,␈α
but␈α
also␈α∞allow␈α
them␈α
to␈α
share␈α
files␈α
of␈α
data␈α
and␈α
programs␈α∞and␈α
to
␈↓ α∧␈↓communicate␈αwith␈αeach␈αother.␈α They␈αare␈αoften␈αused␈αfor␈αmany␈αyears␈αwith␈αcontinual␈αsmall␈αchanges,
␈↓ α∧␈↓and␈αand␈αthe␈αpeople␈αmaking␈αthe␈αchanges␈αand␈αcorrecting␈αerrors␈αare␈αoften␈αdifferent␈αnot␈αthe␈αoriginal
␈↓ α∧␈↓authors␈α
of␈α
the␈αsystem.␈α
A␈α
person␈αconfronted␈α
with␈α
the␈αtask␈α
of␈α
correcting␈αa␈α
malfunction␈α
or␈αmaking␈α
a
␈↓ α∧␈↓change in a time-sharing system can conveniently use a mentalistic model of the system.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Thus␈α⊂suppose␈α∂a␈α⊂user␈α∂complains␈α⊂that␈α⊂the␈α∂system␈α⊂will␈α∂not␈α⊂run␈α∂his␈α⊂program.␈α⊂ Perhaps␈α∂the
␈↓ α∧␈↓system␈αbelieves␈α
that␈αhe␈αdoesn't␈α
want␈αto␈α
run,␈αperhaps␈αit␈α
persistently␈αbelieves␈αthat␈α
he␈αhas␈α
just␈αrun,
␈↓ α∧␈↓perhaps␈αit␈αbelieves␈αthat␈αhis␈αquota␈αof␈αcomputer␈αresources␈αis␈αexhausted,␈αor␈αperhaps␈αit␈αbelieves␈αthat
␈↓ α∧␈↓his␈αprogram␈αrequires␈αa␈αresource␈αthat␈αis␈αunavailable.␈α Testing␈αthese␈αhypotheses␈αcan␈αoften␈α
be␈αdone
␈↓ α∧␈↓with surprisingly little understanding of the internal workings of the program.
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→→There will be more examples here of the belief of time-sharing systems.←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu18␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓4.␈α↔␈↓αPrograms␈α_designed␈α↔to␈α_reason.␈↓␈α↔ Suppose␈α↔we␈α_explicitly␈α↔design␈α_a␈α↔program␈α_to␈α↔represent
␈↓ α∧␈↓information␈αby␈αsentences␈αin␈αa␈αcertain␈αlanguage␈αstored␈αin␈αthe␈αmemory␈αof␈αthe␈αcomputer␈αand␈αdecide
␈↓ α∧␈↓what␈αto␈α
do␈αby␈α
making␈αinferences,␈αand␈α
doing␈αwhat␈α
it␈αconcludes␈αwill␈α
advance␈αits␈α
goals.␈α Naturally,
␈↓ α∧␈↓we␈αwould␈αhope␈αthat␈αour␈αprevious␈αsecond␈αorder␈αdefinition␈αof␈αbelief␈αwill␈α"approve␈αof"␈αa␈α␈↓↓B(p,s)␈↓␈αthat
␈↓ α∧␈↓ascribed␈α∩to␈α∩the␈α⊃program␈α∩believing␈α∩the␈α⊃sentences␈α∩explicitly␈α∩built␈α⊃in.␈α∩ We␈α∩would␈α∩be␈α⊃somewhat
␈↓ α∧␈↓embarassed␈αif␈αsomeone␈αwere␈αto␈αshow␈αthat␈α
our␈αsecond␈αorder␈αdefinition␈αapproved␈αas␈αwell␈α
or␈αbetter
␈↓ α∧␈↓of an entirely different set of beliefs.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Such a program was first proposed in (McCarthy 1960), and here is how it might work:
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Information␈αabout␈αthe␈αworld␈αis␈αstored␈αin␈αa␈αwide␈αvariety␈αof␈αdata␈αstructures.␈α For␈αexample,␈αa
␈↓ α∧␈↓visual␈α∂scene␈α∂received␈α∂by␈α∂a␈α∂TV␈α∂camera␈α∂may␈α∂be␈α∂represented␈α∂by␈α∂a␈α∂512x512x3␈α∂array␈α⊂of␈α∂numbers
␈↓ α∧␈↓representing␈αthe␈αintensities␈αof␈αthree␈α
colors␈αat␈αthe␈αpoints␈αof␈α
the␈αvisual␈αfield.␈α At␈αanother␈α
level,␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓same␈αscene␈α
may␈αbe␈α
represented␈αby␈α
a␈αlist␈α
of␈αregions,␈αand␈α
at␈αa␈α
further␈αlevel␈α
there␈αmay␈α
be␈αa␈α
list␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓physical␈α
objects␈α
and␈αtheir␈α
parts␈α
together␈αwith␈α
other␈α
information␈αabout␈α
these␈α
objects␈αobtained␈α
from
␈↓ α∧␈↓non-visual␈αsources.␈α Moreover,␈αinformation␈αabout␈αhow␈αto␈αsolve␈αvarious␈αkinds␈αof␈αproblems␈αmay␈αbe
␈↓ α∧␈↓represented by programs in some programming language.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ However,␈α⊂all␈α⊂the␈α⊂above␈α∂representations␈α⊂are␈α⊂subordinate␈α⊂to␈α∂a␈α⊂collection␈α⊂of␈α⊂sentences␈α⊂in␈α∂a
␈↓ α∧␈↓suitable␈α∂first␈α∂order␈α∂language␈α∞that␈α∂includes␈α∂set␈α∂theory.␈α∂ By␈α∞subordinate,␈α∂we␈α∂mean␈α∂that␈α∂there␈α∞are
␈↓ α∧␈↓sentences␈α
that␈α
tell␈α
what␈α
the␈α
data␈α
structures␈α
represent␈α
and␈α
what␈α
the␈α
programs␈α
do.␈α
New␈αsentences
␈↓ α∧␈↓can␈αarise␈αby␈αa␈αvariety␈αof␈αprocesses:␈αinference␈αfrom␈αsentences␈αalready␈αpresent,␈αby␈αcomputation␈αfrom
␈↓ α∧␈↓the data structures representing observations, ...
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→→There will be more here about what mental qualities should be programmed.←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu19␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ∧`"GLOSSARY" OF MENTAL QUALITIES
␈↓ α∧␈↓ In␈α
this␈α
section␈α
we␈α∞give␈α
short␈α
"definitions"␈α
for␈α
machines␈α∞of␈α
a␈α
collection␈α
of␈α∞mental␈α
qualities.
␈↓ α∧␈↓We␈αinclude␈αa␈αnumber␈αof␈α
terms␈αwhich␈αgive␈αus␈αdifficulty␈α
with␈αan␈αindication␈αof␈αwhat␈αthe␈α
difficulties
␈↓ α∧␈↓seem to be.
␈↓ α∧␈↓1.␈α␈↓αActions␈↓.␈α We␈αwant␈αto␈αdistinguish␈αthe␈αactions␈αof␈αa␈αbeing␈αfrom␈αevents␈αthat␈αoccur␈αin␈αits␈αbody␈αand
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈α⊃affect␈α⊃the␈α⊂outside␈α⊃world.␈α⊃ For␈α⊃example,␈α⊂we␈α⊃wish␈α⊃to␈α⊃distinguish␈α⊂a␈α⊃random␈α⊃twitch␈α⊃from␈α⊂a
␈↓ α∧␈↓purposeful␈α∞movement.␈α
This␈α∞is␈α∞not␈α
difficult␈α∞␈↓↓relative␈α∞to␈α
a␈α∞theory␈α∞of␈α
belief␈α∞that␈α∞includes␈α
intentions␈↓.
␈↓ α∧␈↓One's␈α⊂purposeful␈α⊃actions␈α⊂are␈α⊂those␈α⊃that␈α⊂would␈α⊃have␈α⊂been␈α⊂different␈α⊃had␈α⊂one's␈α⊃intentions␈α⊂been
␈↓ α∧␈↓different.␈α∞ This␈α
requires␈α∞that␈α
the␈α∞theory␈α
of␈α∞belief␈α
have␈α∞sufficient␈α
Cartesian␈α∞product␈α∞structure␈α
so
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈αthe␈αcounterfactual␈αconditional␈α`"if␈αits␈α
intentions␈αhad␈αbeen␈αdifferent"␈αis␈αdefined␈αin␈α
the␈αtheory.
␈↓ α∧␈↓As␈α
explained␈α
in␈α∞the␈α
section␈α
on␈α
definitions␈α∞relative␈α
to␈α
an␈α
approximate␈α∞theory,␈α
it␈α
is␈α∞not␈α
necessary
␈↓ α∧␈↓that the counterfactual be given a meaning in terms of the real world.
␈↓ α∧␈↓2. ␈↓αIntrospection and self-knowledge.␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ We␈α say␈αthat␈α a␈α machine␈αintrospects␈α when␈αit␈α comes␈α to␈αhave␈αbeliefs␈αabout␈αits␈αown␈αmental
␈↓ α∧␈↓state.␈α∞ A␈α∞simple␈α∞form␈α∂of␈α∞ introspection␈α∞takes␈α∞ place␈α∂ when␈α∞ a␈α∞ program␈α∞ determines␈α∂ whether␈α∞ it
␈↓ α∧␈↓has␈α certain␈αinformation␈α and␈αif␈αnot␈αasks␈αfor␈αit.␈α Often␈αan␈αoperating␈αsystem␈αwill␈αcompute␈αa␈αcheck
␈↓ α∧␈↓sum␈αof␈αitself␈α
every␈αfew␈αminutes␈α
to␈αverify␈αthat␈α it␈α
hasn't␈αbeen␈αchanged␈α
by␈αa␈αsoftware␈αor␈α
hardware
␈↓ α∧␈↓malfunction.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ In␈α∞principle,␈α∂ introspection␈α∞is␈α∞easier␈α∂ for␈α∞computer␈α∞programs␈α∂than␈α∞for␈α∞people,␈α∂because␈α∞the
␈↓ α∧␈↓entire␈α∂memory␈α⊂in␈α∂which␈α⊂programs␈α∂and␈α⊂data␈α∂are␈α⊂stored␈α∂is␈α⊂available␈α∂for␈α⊂inspection.␈α∂ In␈α⊂fact,␈α∂a
␈↓ α∧␈↓computer␈αprogram␈αcan␈α be␈α made␈αto␈α predict␈αhow␈α it␈α would␈αreact␈α to␈α particular␈αinputs␈αprovided
␈↓ α∧␈↓it␈αhas␈αenough␈αfree␈αstorage␈α
to␈αperform␈αthe␈αcalculation.␈α This␈α
situation␈αsmells␈αof␈αparadox,␈αand␈α
there
␈↓ α∧␈↓is␈αone.␈α Namely,␈αif␈αa␈αprogram␈αcould␈αpredict␈αits␈αown␈αactions␈αin␈αless␈αtime␈αthan␈αit␈αtakes␈αto␈αcarry␈αout
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu20␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α∂action,␈α∂it␈α∂could␈α∂refuse␈α∂ to␈α∂do␈α∂what␈α∂it␈α∂has␈α∂predicted␈α∂ for␈α∂itself.␈α∂ This␈α∂only␈α∂ shows␈α∂that␈α∞self-
␈↓ α∧␈↓simulation is necessarily a slow process, and this is not surprising.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ However,␈α⊂ present␈α⊂ programs␈α⊂ do␈α⊂ little␈α∂ interesting␈α⊂introspection.␈α⊂ This␈α⊂is␈α⊂just␈α∂ a
␈↓ α∧␈↓matter␈αof␈α the␈α
undeveloped␈α state␈αof␈α
artificial␈α intelligence;␈αprogrammers␈α
don't␈αyet␈αknow␈α
how␈αto
␈↓ α∧␈↓make a computer program look at itself in a useful way.
␈↓ α∧␈↓3.␈α⊂ ␈↓αConsciousness␈α⊂and␈α⊂self-consciousness␈↓.␈α⊂ In␈α∂accordance␈α⊂with␈α⊂the␈α⊂general␈α⊂ approach␈α⊂ of␈α∂ this
␈↓ α∧␈↓paper,␈α∞ a␈α
being␈α∞ is␈α
considered␈α∞self-conscious␈α
iff␈α∞it␈α
has␈α∞certain␈α
beliefs␈α∞about␈α
itself.␈α∞However,␈α
we
␈↓ α∧␈↓must␈αremember␈αthat␈αbeliefs␈αare␈αtaken␈αas␈α
sentences␈αin␈αour␈αlanguage,␈αand␈α by␈αascribing␈α
beliefs␈α we
␈↓ α∧␈↓are not asserting that the being uses that language directly or any other language.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Here␈α
is␈α
a␈α
hypothesis␈α
arising␈α∞ from␈α
artificial␈α
intelligence␈α
concerning␈α
the␈α∞relation␈α
between
␈↓ α∧␈↓language␈α
and␈αthought.␈α
Imagine␈α
a␈αperson␈α
or␈αmachine␈α
that␈α
represents␈α information␈α
internally␈αin␈α
a
␈↓ α∧␈↓huge␈α
network.␈α
Each␈α
node␈α
of␈α
the␈α
network␈α
has␈α
references␈α
to␈α
other␈α
nodes␈α
through␈αrelations.
␈↓ α∧␈↓(If␈αthe␈αsystem␈αhas␈α
a␈α variable␈α collection␈αof␈α
relations,␈αthen␈αthe␈αrelations␈α
have␈αto␈αbe␈αrepresented␈α
by
␈↓ α∧␈↓nodes,␈α
and␈α
we␈α
get␈α
a␈α
symmetrical␈α
theory␈α
if␈α
we␈α
suppose␈α
that␈α
each␈α
node␈α
is␈α
connected␈α
to␈α
a␈α
set␈αof␈α
pairs
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈α⊂other␈α⊂nodes).␈α∂ We␈α⊂can␈α⊂imagine␈α∂this␈α⊂structure␈α⊂to␈α∂have␈α⊂a␈α⊂long␈α∂term␈α⊂part␈α⊂and␈α⊂also␈α∂extremely
␈↓ α∧␈↓temporary␈αparts␈αrepresenting␈αcurrent␈α ␈↓↓thoughts␈↓.␈α Naturally,␈α each␈α being␈α has␈α a␈αits␈αown␈αnetwork
␈↓ α∧␈↓depending␈α∩on␈α∩ its␈α∩own␈α∩experience.␈α∩A␈α∩ thought␈α∩is␈α∩then␈α∩ a␈α∩temporary␈α∩ node␈α∩ currently␈α∩ being
␈↓ α∧␈↓referenced␈α by␈α the␈α mechanism␈α of␈αconsciousness.␈α Its␈α meaning␈αis␈αdetermined␈αby␈αits␈αreferences␈αto
␈↓ α∧␈↓other␈α⊗nodes␈α⊗which␈α⊗ in␈α⊗turn␈α⊗ refer␈α⊗to␈α∃ yet␈α⊗other␈α⊗ nodes.␈α⊗ Now␈α⊗consider␈α⊗ the␈α⊗problem␈α∃of
␈↓ α∧␈↓communicating a thought to another being.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Its␈α∀full␈α∀communication␈α∀would␈α∀ involve␈α∀transmitting␈α∀the␈α∀entire␈α∀network␈α∀ that␈α∀ can␈α∪ be
␈↓ α∧␈↓reached␈α from␈α the␈α given␈α node,␈αand␈αthis␈αwould␈αordinarily␈αconstitute␈αthe␈αentire␈αexperience␈αof␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓being.␈α More␈α
than␈αthat,␈α
it␈αwould␈α
be␈α necessary␈α
to␈α also␈α
communicate␈αthe␈α
programs␈αthat␈αthat␈α
take
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu21␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓action␈α⊂on␈α⊃the␈α⊂basis␈α⊂of␈α⊃encountering␈α⊂certain␈α⊂nodes.␈α⊃ Even␈α⊂if␈α⊂all␈α⊃this␈α⊂could␈α⊂be␈α⊃transmitted,␈α⊂the
␈↓ α∧␈↓recipient␈α∩would␈α⊃still␈α∩have␈α⊃to␈α∩find␈α⊃equivalents␈α∩ for␈α⊃ the␈α∩ information␈α⊃ in␈α∩ terms␈α⊃ of␈α∩ its␈α⊃ own
␈↓ α∧␈↓network.␈α Therefore,␈αthoughts␈α have␈α
to␈α be␈αtranslated␈α into␈α a␈α
public␈α language␈αbefore␈αthey␈αcan␈α
be
␈↓ α∧␈↓commuunicated.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ A␈α∂language␈α∂ is␈α∂also␈α⊂a␈α∂network␈α∂ of␈α∂associations␈α⊂and␈α∂ programs.␈α∂ However,␈α∂certain␈α⊂ of␈α∂the
␈↓ α∧␈↓nodes␈α in␈αthis␈αnetwork␈α(more␈αaccurately␈αa␈α␈↓↓family␈↓␈αof␈αnetworks,␈αsince␈αno␈αtwo␈αpeople␈αspeak␈αprecisely
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α∞same␈α∞language)␈α∂are␈α∞ associated␈α∞with␈α∂words␈α∞ or␈α∞set␈α∂phrases.␈α∞ Sometimes␈α∞the␈α∂translation␈α∞from
␈↓ α∧␈↓thoughts␈α∂to␈α∂sentences␈α∞is␈α∂easy,␈α∂because␈α∞large␈α∂ parts␈α∂of␈α∞the␈α∂ private␈α∂networks␈α∞are␈α∂taken␈α∂from␈α∞the
␈↓ α∧␈↓public␈α∩network,␈α∩and␈α∩there␈α∩is␈α∩an␈α∩advantage␈α∩in␈α∩preserving␈α∩the␈α∩correspondence.␈α∩ However,␈α∩the
␈↓ α∧␈↓translation␈αis␈αalways␈αapproximate␈α(in␈αsense␈αthat␈αstill␈αlacks␈αa␈αtechnical␈αdefinition),␈αand␈αsome␈α areas
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈α⊂experience␈α∂ are␈α⊂ difficult␈α∂to␈α⊂ translate␈α∂ at␈α⊂ all.␈α∂ Sometimes␈α⊂this␈α∂is␈α⊂for␈α∂intrinsic␈α⊂ reasons,␈α∂and
␈↓ α∧␈↓sometimes␈α
because␈α
particular␈αcultures␈α
don't␈α
use␈α
language␈αin␈α
this␈α
area.␈α (It␈α
is␈α
my␈α
impression␈αthat
␈↓ α∧␈↓cultures␈αdiffer␈αin␈αthe␈α extent␈αto␈αwhich␈αinformation␈αabout␈α facial␈αappearance␈αthat␈αcan␈αbe␈αused␈αfor
␈↓ α∧␈↓recognition␈α
is␈α verbally␈α
transmitted).␈α
According␈αto␈α
this␈αscheme,␈α
the␈α
"deep␈αstructure"␈α
of␈αa␈α
publicly
␈↓ α∧␈↓expressible␈αthought␈α is␈αa␈αnode␈αin␈αthe␈αpublic␈αnetwork.␈α It␈αis␈αtranslated␈αinto␈αthe␈αdeep␈αstructure␈αof␈αa
␈↓ α∧␈↓sentence␈α⊃as␈α⊃a␈α⊃tree␈α⊃ whose␈α⊃terminal␈α⊃nodes␈α⊃are␈α⊃the␈α⊃nodes␈α⊃to␈α⊃ which␈α⊃words␈α⊃or␈α⊃set␈α⊃ phrases␈α⊂are
␈↓ α∧␈↓attached.␈α∂ This␈α⊂"deep␈α∂ structure"␈α⊂then␈α∂must␈α⊂be␈α∂translated␈α⊂into␈α∂a␈α⊂string␈α∂in␈α⊂a␈α∂spoken␈α⊂or␈α∂written
␈↓ α∧␈↓language.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ The␈α
need␈αto␈α
use␈αlanguage␈α
to␈αexpress␈α
thought␈αalso␈α
applies␈αwhen␈α
we␈αhave␈α
to␈αascribe␈α
thoughts
␈↓ α∧␈↓to other beings, since we cannot put the entire network into a single sentence.
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→→→→→→→There␈α#is␈α$more␈α#to␈α$come␈α#here␈α#about␈α$what␈α#ideas␈α$are␈α#←←←←←←←←←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→→→→→→→needed for self-consciousness.←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓4. ␈↓αIntentions.␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu22␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓ We␈α⊂may␈α⊂say␈α⊂that␈α⊂a␈α⊂machine␈α⊂intends␈α⊂to␈α⊂perform␈α⊂an␈α⊂action␈α⊂when␈α⊂it␈α⊂believes␈α⊂that␈α⊂it␈α⊂will
␈↓ α∧␈↓perform␈αthe␈α
action␈αand␈α
it␈αbelieves␈α
that␈αthe␈α
action␈αwill␈α
further␈αa␈α
goal.␈α However,␈α
further␈αanalysis
␈↓ α∧␈↓may␈αshow␈α
that␈αno␈αsuch␈α
first␈αorder␈α
definition␈αin␈αterms␈α
of␈αbelief␈α
adequately␈αdescribes␈αintentions.␈α
In
␈↓ α∧␈↓this␈α
case,␈α∞we␈α
can␈α∞try␈α
a␈α∞second␈α
order␈α
definition␈α∞based␈α
on␈α∞an␈α
axiomatization␈α∞of␈α
a␈α∞predicate␈α
␈↓↓I(a,s)␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓meaning that the machine intends the action ␈↓↓a␈↓ when it is in state ␈↓↓s. ␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓5. ␈↓αFree will␈↓
␈↓ α∧␈↓ When␈αwe␈αprogram␈αa␈α
computer␈α to␈α make␈αchoices␈α
intelligently␈α after␈αdetermining␈αits␈α
options,
␈↓ α∧␈↓examining␈αtheir␈αconsequences,␈αand␈α
deciding␈αwhich␈αis␈α most␈α
favorable␈αor␈αmost␈αmoral␈αor␈α
whatever,
␈↓ α∧␈↓we␈α
must␈α
program␈α
it␈α
to␈α
take␈α
an␈α
attitude␈α
towards␈α
its␈α
freedom␈α
of␈α
choice␈αessentially␈α
isomorphic
␈↓ α∧␈↓to that which a human must take to his own.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ We␈α⊂can␈α⊂define␈α⊂whether␈α⊂a␈α⊂particular␈α⊂action␈α⊂was␈α⊂free␈α⊂or␈α⊂forced␈α⊂relative␈α⊂to␈α⊂a␈α⊂theory␈α⊂that
␈↓ α∧␈↓ascribes␈αbeliefs␈αand␈αwithin␈αwhich␈α
beings␈αdo␈αwhat␈αthey␈αbelieve␈α
will␈αadvance␈αtheir␈αgoals.␈α In␈αsuch␈α
a
␈↓ α∧␈↓theory,␈α∞action␈α∞is␈α∞precipitated␈α∞by␈α∞a␈α∂belief␈α∞of␈α∞the␈α∞form␈α∞␈↓↓I␈α∞should␈α∂do␈α∞X␈α∞now␈↓.␈α∞ We␈α∞will␈α∞say␈α∂that␈α∞the
␈↓ α∧␈↓action␈αwas␈α
free␈αif␈αchanging␈α
the␈αbelief␈α
to␈α␈↓↓I␈αshouldn't␈α
do␈αX␈α
now␈↓␈αwould␈αhave␈α
resulted␈αin␈α
the␈αaction
␈↓ α∧␈↓not␈α∞being␈α∞performed.␈α∞ This␈α∞requires␈α∞that␈α
the␈α∞theory␈α∞of␈α∞belief␈α∞have␈α∞sufficient␈α∞Cartesian␈α
product
␈↓ α∧␈↓structure␈αso␈αthat␈αchanging␈αa␈αsingle␈αbelief␈αis␈αdefined,␈αbut␈αit␈αdoesn't␈αrequire␈αdefining␈αwhat␈αthe␈αstate
␈↓ α∧␈↓of the world would be if a single belief were different.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ This␈α∂isn't␈α∞the␈α∂ whole␈α∂free␈α∞will␈α∂story,␈α∞because␈α∂ moralists␈α∂are␈α∞also␈α∂ concerned␈α∂with␈α∞whether
␈↓ α∧␈↓praise␈α
or␈α∞blame␈α
may␈α
be␈α∞ attributed␈α
to␈α
a␈α∞choice.␈α
The␈α
following␈α∞ considerations␈α
would␈α∞ seem␈α
to
␈↓ α∧␈↓apply to any attempt to define the morality of actions in a way that would apply to machines:
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$5.1.␈αThere␈αis␈αunlikely␈α
to␈αbe␈αa␈αsimple␈α
behavioral␈α definition.␈α Instead␈αthere␈α
would␈αbe
␈↓ α∧␈↓a second order definition criticizing predicates that ascribe morality to actions.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$5.2.␈α∩The␈α∪theory␈α∩must␈α∪contain␈α∩at␈α∩least␈α∪one␈α∩axiom␈α∪of␈α∩morality␈α∩that␈α∪is␈α∩not␈α∪just␈α∩a
␈↓ α∧␈↓statement of physical fact. Relative to this axiom, judgments of actions can be factual.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu23␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$5.3.␈αThe␈αtheory␈αof␈αmorality␈αwill␈αpresuppose␈αa␈αtheory␈αof␈αbelief␈αin␈αwhich␈αstatements␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈αform␈α␈↓↓"It␈αbelieved␈αthe␈αaction␈αwould␈αharm␈αsomeone"␈↓␈αare␈αdefined.␈α The␈αtheory␈αmust␈αascribe␈αbeliefs
␈↓ α∧␈↓about others' welfare and perhaps about the being's own welfare.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$5.4.␈α⊂It␈α⊂might␈α∂be␈α⊂necessary␈α⊂to␈α⊂consider␈α∂the␈α⊂ machine␈α⊂as␈α∂imbedded␈α⊂in␈α⊂some␈α⊂kind␈α∂of
␈↓ α∧␈↓society in order to ascribe morality to its actions.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$5.5.␈αNo␈α
present␈αmachines␈αadmit␈α
such␈αa␈α
belief␈α structure,␈αand␈α
no␈αsuch␈αstructure␈α
may
␈↓ α∧␈↓be␈α⊃required␈α⊂ to␈α⊃make␈α⊂ a␈α⊃machine␈α⊂with␈α⊃ arbitrarily␈α⊂high␈α⊃intelligence␈α⊂in␈α⊃the␈α⊂sense␈α⊃of␈α⊂problem-
␈↓ α∧␈↓solving ability.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$5.6.␈αIt␈αseems␈α doubtful␈αthat␈αmorally␈α judgable␈αmachines␈αor␈α machines␈αto␈αwhich␈αrights
␈↓ α∧␈↓might legitimately be ascribed are desirable if and when it becomes possible to make them.
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→→→More mental qualities will be discussed.←←←←←←←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu24␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ¬ OTHER VIEWS ABOUT MIND
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→→This section will be written←←←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu25␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εMNOTES
␈↓ α∧␈↓1.␈α∞Work␈α
in␈α∞artificial␈α∞intelligence␈α
is␈α∞still␈α∞far␈α
from␈α∞showing␈α∞how␈α
to␈α∞reach␈α∞human-level␈α
intellectual
␈↓ α∧␈↓performance.␈α∞Our␈α∞approach␈α∞to␈α∞the␈α∞AI␈α∞problem␈α∞involves␈α∞identifying␈α∞the␈α∞intellectual␈α
mechanisms
␈↓ α∧␈↓required␈α
for␈α
problem␈α
solving␈α
and␈α
describing␈α
them␈αprecisely.␈α
Therefore␈α
we␈α
are␈α
at␈α
the␈α
end␈α
of␈αthe
␈↓ α∧␈↓philosophical␈α⊃spectrum␈α⊂that␈α⊃requires␈α⊂everything␈α⊃to␈α⊂be␈α⊃formalized␈α⊂in␈α⊃mathematical␈α⊂logic.␈α⊃It␈α⊂ is
␈↓ α∧␈↓sometimes␈α said␈α that␈α one␈αstudies␈αphilosophy␈α in␈αorder␈αto␈αadvance␈αbeyond␈α one's␈αuntutored␈αnaive
␈↓ α∧␈↓world-view,␈α∩but␈α∩unfortunately␈α∩for␈α∪ artificial␈α∩intelligence,␈α∩no-one␈α∩has␈α∪yet␈α∩been␈α∩able␈α∩to␈α∪give␈α∩a
␈↓ α∧␈↓description␈α
of␈α
even␈α
a␈αnaive␈α
world-view,␈α
complete␈α
and␈αprecise␈α
enough␈α
to␈α
allow␈αa␈α
knowledge-seeking
␈↓ α∧␈↓program to be constructed in accordance with its tenets.
␈↓ α∧␈↓2.␈α
Present␈α
AI␈α
programs␈α
operate␈α
in␈α
limited␈α
domains,␈α
e.g.␈α
play␈α
particular␈α
games,␈α
prove␈α
theorems␈αin␈α
a
␈↓ α∧␈↓particular␈α
logical␈α∞system,␈α
or␈α
understand␈α∞natural␈α
language␈α
sentences␈α∞covering␈α
a␈α∞particular␈α
subject
␈↓ α∧␈↓matter␈α∞and␈α∞with␈α∞other␈α∞semantic␈α∞restrictions.␈α∞ General␈α∞intelligence␈α∞will␈α∞require␈α∞general␈α∂models␈α∞of
␈↓ α∧␈↓situations␈α
changing␈α∞in␈α
time,␈α∞actors␈α
with␈α∞goals␈α
and␈α∞strategies␈α
for␈α∞achieving␈α
them,␈α∞and␈α
knowledge
␈↓ α∧␈↓about how information can be obtained.
␈↓ α∧␈↓3.␈α This␈α
kind␈α of␈α
teleological␈α analysis␈α is␈α
often␈α useful␈α
in␈αunderstanding␈αnatural␈α
organisms
␈↓ α∧␈↓as␈αwell␈αas␈αmachines.␈α Here␈α evolution␈αtakes␈α the␈αplace␈α of␈α design␈αand␈α we␈α often␈αunderstand␈α the
␈↓ α∧␈↓function␈α∩performed␈α∩by␈α∩ an␈α∩organ␈α⊃before␈α∩we␈α∩ understand␈α∩its␈α∩detailed␈α∩physiology.␈α⊃Teleological
␈↓ α∧␈↓analysis␈α is␈α applicable␈αto␈α psychological␈α and␈α social␈αphenomena␈αin␈α so␈αfar␈αas␈α these␈αare␈αdesigned
␈↓ α∧␈↓or␈α⊂have␈α⊂been␈α∂ subject␈α⊂to␈α⊂selection.␈α∂ However,␈α⊂ teleological␈α⊂analysis␈α∂fails␈α⊂when␈α⊂applied␈α∂to
␈↓ α∧␈↓aspects␈α
of␈αnature␈α
which␈α
have␈αneither␈α
been␈α
designed␈αnor␈α
produced␈α
by␈α natural␈α
selection␈α
from␈αa
␈↓ α∧␈↓population.␈α
Much␈α
medieval␈α
science␈α
was␈α
based␈α
on␈α
the␈α
Judeo-Christian-Moslem␈α∞ hypothesis␈α
that
␈↓ α∧␈↓the␈α
details␈αof␈α
the␈αworld␈α
were␈αdesigned␈α
by␈αGod␈α
for␈α
the␈αbenefit␈α
of␈αman.␈α
The␈αstrong␈α
form␈αof␈α
this
␈↓ α∧␈↓hypothesis␈α∞was␈α∞abandoned␈α
at␈α∞the␈α∞time␈α
of␈α∞ Galileo␈α∞and␈α
Newton␈α∞but␈α∞occasionally␈α∞recurs.␈α
Barry
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu26␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓Commoner's␈α(1972)␈αaxiom␈αof␈α ecology␈α"Nature␈αknows␈αbest"␈α seems␈αto␈αbe␈αmistakenly␈αbased␈αon␈α the
␈↓ α∧␈↓notion␈α
that␈αnature␈α
as␈αa␈α
whole␈α is␈α
the␈α result␈α
of␈α an␈α
evolutionary␈α process␈α
that␈αselected␈α
the␈α"best
␈↓ α∧␈↓nature".
␈↓ α∧␈↓4. Novelty is not absolutely guaranteed.
␈↓ α∧␈↓5.␈α∂Behavioral␈α∞ definitions␈α∂are␈α∞often␈α∂ favored␈α∂in␈α∞ philosophy.␈α∂ A␈α∞system␈α∂is␈α∞ defined␈α∂to␈α∂ have␈α∞ a
␈↓ α∧␈↓certain␈α∞ quality␈α∞if␈α∞ it␈α∞behaves␈α∞ in␈α∞ a␈α∞certain␈α∞way␈α∞ or␈α∞ is␈α∞ ␈↓↓disposed␈↓␈α∞to␈α∞behave␈α∞ in␈α∞a␈α∂ certain␈α∞way.
␈↓ α∧␈↓Their␈α∀ ostensible␈α∀ virtue␈α∃ is␈α∀ conservatism;␈α∀ they␈α∀ don't␈α∃ postulate␈α∀internal␈α∀ states␈α∃that␈α∀ are
␈↓ α∧␈↓unobservable␈α
to␈α present␈α
science␈α and␈α
may␈αremain␈α
unobservable.␈αHowever,␈α
such␈α
definitions␈αare
␈↓ α∧␈↓awkward␈α∞for␈α∞ mental␈α∞qualities,␈α∞because,␈α∞as␈α∞common␈α∞sense␈α∞ suggests,␈α∞a␈α∞ mental␈α∞quality␈α∞ may␈α
not
␈↓ α∧␈↓result␈α∂ in␈α∂behavior,␈α∂because␈α∂another␈α∂mental␈α∂ quality␈α∂may␈α∂prevent␈α∂it;␈α∂e.g.␈α∂ I␈α∂may␈α∂think␈α⊂you␈α∂are
␈↓ α∧␈↓thick-headed,␈αbut␈αpoliteness␈αmay␈αprevent␈αmy␈αsaying␈αso.␈αParticular␈α difficulties␈α can␈α be␈α overcome,
␈↓ α∧␈↓but␈α∂ an␈α∂ impression␈α⊂ of␈α∂vagueness␈α∂remains.␈α∂ The␈α⊂liking␈α∂ for␈α∂behavioral␈α∂definitions␈α⊂stems␈α∂from
␈↓ α∧␈↓caution,␈α∩but␈α∩ I␈α∪would␈α∩interpret␈α∩scientific␈α∩experience␈α∪as␈α∩showing␈α∩that␈α∩boldness␈α∪in␈α∩postulating
␈↓ α∧␈↓complex␈αstructures␈αof␈αunobserved␈α entities␈α-␈αprovided␈αit␈αis␈α accompanied␈αby␈αa␈αwillingness␈αto␈α take
␈↓ α∧␈↓back␈α∂mistakes␈α∂-␈α∂is␈α∂more␈α∂likely␈α∂to␈α⊂be␈α∂rewarded␈α∂by␈α∂understanding␈α∂of␈α∂ and␈α∂ control␈α⊂ over␈α∂nature
␈↓ α∧␈↓than␈α⊗ is␈α⊗ positivistic␈α⊗ timidity.␈α⊗ It␈α∃ is␈α⊗ particularly␈α⊗instructive␈α⊗to␈α⊗imagine␈α⊗a␈α∃determined
␈↓ α∧␈↓behaviorist␈α⊗trying␈α∃to␈α⊗figure␈α∃ out␈α⊗an␈α⊗ electronic␈α∃ computer.␈α⊗ Trying␈α∃to␈α⊗define␈α⊗each␈α∃quality
␈↓ α∧␈↓behaviorally␈α⊃would␈α⊃get␈α⊃him␈α⊃nowhere;␈α⊃ only␈α⊃ simultaneously␈α⊃ postulating␈α⊃ a␈α∩ complex␈α⊃structure
␈↓ α∧␈↓including␈α⊂ memory,␈α∂arithmetic␈α⊂unit,␈α⊂control␈α∂structure,␈α⊂and␈α∂input-output␈α⊂would␈α⊂yield␈α∂predictions
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈α∀ could␈α∀ be␈α∀ compared␈α∀ with␈α∀experiment.␈α∀ There␈α∀is␈α∀a␈α∀sense␈α∀in␈α∀which␈α∀operational
␈↓ α∧␈↓definitions␈α
are␈α
not␈αtaken␈α
seriously␈α
even␈αby␈α
their␈α
proposers.␈α Suppose␈α
someone␈α
gives␈αan␈α
operational
␈↓ α∧␈↓definition␈αof␈αlength␈α
(e.g.␈αinvolving␈αa␈αcertain␈α
platinum␈αbar),␈αand␈αa␈α
whole␈αschool␈αof␈α
physicists␈αand
␈↓ α∧␈↓philosophers␈αbecomes␈αquite␈αattached␈αto␈αit.␈α A␈αfew␈αyears␈αlater,␈αsomeone␈αelse␈αcriticizes␈αthe␈αdefinition
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu27␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓as␈α⊃lacking␈α∩some␈α⊃desirable␈α⊃property,␈α∩proposes␈α⊃a␈α⊃change,␈α∩and␈α⊃the␈α⊃change␈α∩is␈α⊃accepted.␈α∩ This␈α⊃is
␈↓ α∧␈↓normal,␈αbut␈αif␈αthe␈αoriginal␈αdefinition␈αexpressed␈αwhat␈αthey␈αreally␈αmeant␈αby␈αthe␈αlength,␈αthey␈αwould
␈↓ α∧␈↓refuse␈αto␈αchange,␈αarguing␈αthat␈αthe␈αnew␈αconcept␈αmay␈αhave␈αits␈αuses,␈αbut␈αit␈αisn't␈αwhat␈αthey␈αmean␈αby
␈↓ α∧␈↓"length".␈α This␈αshows␈αthat␈αthe␈αconcept␈αof␈α"length"␈α
as␈αa␈αproperty␈αof␈αobjects␈αis␈αmore␈αstable␈αthan␈α
any
␈↓ α∧␈↓operational definition.
␈↓ α∧␈↓6.␈αWhether␈α
a␈αsystem␈αhas␈α
beliefs␈αand␈αother␈α
mental␈αqualities␈α
is␈αnot␈αprimarily␈α
a␈αmatter␈αof␈α
complexity
␈↓ α∧␈↓of␈αthe␈α
system.␈α Although␈α
cars␈αare␈α
more␈αcomplex␈αthan␈α
thermostats,␈αit␈α
is␈αhard␈α
to␈αascribe␈α
beliefs␈αor
␈↓ α∧␈↓goals␈αto␈αthem,␈αand␈αthe␈αsame␈αis␈αperhaps␈αtrue␈αof␈αthe␈αbasic␈αhardware␈αof␈αa␈αcomputer,␈αi.e.␈αthe␈αpart␈αof
␈↓ α∧␈↓the computer that executes the program without the program itself.
␈↓ α∧␈↓7.␈α Our␈αown␈αability␈αto␈αderive␈αthe␈αlaws␈αof␈αhigher␈αlevels␈αof␈αorganization␈αfrom␈αknowledge␈α of␈αlower
␈↓ α∧␈↓level␈α⊃laws␈α⊃is␈α⊃ also␈α⊃limited␈α⊃by␈α⊃universality.␈α⊃While␈α⊃there␈α⊃appears␈α⊃to␈α⊃be␈α⊃essentially␈α⊃one␈α⊃possible
␈↓ α∧␈↓chemistry␈αallowed␈αby␈αthe␈αlaws␈α
of␈αphysics,␈αthe␈α laws␈αof␈α
physics␈αand␈αchemistry␈αallow␈αmany␈α
biologies,
␈↓ α∧␈↓and,␈α⊃ because␈α⊃the␈α⊃neuron␈α⊃is␈α⊃a␈α⊂universal␈α⊃computing␈α⊃element,␈α⊃an␈α⊃arbitrary␈α⊃ mental␈α⊃structure␈α⊂is
␈↓ α∧␈↓allowed␈α∩by␈α⊃basic␈α∩ neurophysiology.␈α⊃Therefore,␈α∩ to␈α⊃ determine␈α∩ human␈α⊃ mental␈α∩ structure,␈α⊃ one
␈↓ α∧␈↓must␈α∞ make␈α∞psychological␈α∂ experiments,␈α∞ ␈↓↓or␈↓␈α∞ determine␈α∞ the␈α∂ actual␈α∞ anatomical␈α∞structure␈α∂of␈α∞the
␈↓ α∧␈↓brain␈αand␈αthe␈α information␈αstored␈αin␈αit␈α.␈αOne␈αcannot␈αdetermine␈αthe␈αstructure␈αof␈αthe␈αbrain␈αmerely
␈↓ α∧␈↓from␈α
the␈αfact␈α
that␈αthe␈α
brain␈αis␈α
capable␈αof␈α
certain␈αproblem␈α
solving␈αperformance.␈α
In␈αthis␈α
respect,
␈↓ α∧␈↓our position is similar to that of the Life robot.
␈↓ α∧␈↓8.␈α
Philosophy␈α
and␈α
artificial␈α
intelligence.␈α
These␈α
fields␈α
overlap␈α
in␈α
the␈α
following␈α
way:␈α
In␈α
order␈αto
␈↓ α∧␈↓make␈αa␈αcomputer␈αprogram␈αbehave␈α
intelligently,␈αits␈αdesigner␈αmust␈αbuild␈α
into␈αit␈αa␈αview␈αof␈αthe␈α
world
␈↓ α∧␈↓in␈α⊂general,␈α⊂apart␈α⊃from␈α⊂what␈α⊂they␈α⊃include␈α⊂about␈α⊂particular␈α⊃sciences.␈α⊂ (The␈α⊂skeptic␈α⊃who␈α⊂doubts
␈↓ α∧␈↓whether␈αthere␈αis␈αanything␈αto␈αsay␈αabout␈αthe␈αworld␈αapart␈αfrom␈αthe␈αparticular␈αsciences␈αshould␈αtry␈αto
␈↓ α∧␈↓write␈α
a␈αcomputer␈α
program␈αthat␈α
can␈αfigure␈α
out␈αhow␈α
to␈αget␈α
to␈αTimbuktoo,␈α
taking␈αinto␈α
account␈αnot
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu28␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓only␈αthe␈αfacts␈αabout␈αtravel␈α
in␈αgeneral␈αbut␈αalso␈αfacts␈α
about␈αwhat␈αpeople␈αand␈αdocuments␈α have␈α
what
␈↓ α∧␈↓information,␈αand␈αwhat␈αinformation␈αwill␈αbe␈αrequired␈αat␈αdifferent␈αstages␈αof␈αthe␈αtrip␈αand␈αwhen␈αand
␈↓ α∧␈↓how␈αit␈αis␈αto␈αbe␈αobtained.␈α
He␈αwill␈αrapidly␈αdiscover␈αthat␈αhe␈α
is␈αlacking␈αa␈α␈↓↓science␈αof␈αcommon␈αsense␈↓,␈α
i.e.
␈↓ α∧␈↓he␈α⊃will␈α∩be␈α⊃unable␈α⊃to␈α∩formally␈α⊃express␈α⊃and␈α∩build␈α⊃into␈α⊃his␈α∩program␈α⊃"what␈α∩everybody␈α⊃knows".
␈↓ α∧␈↓Maybe␈αphilosophy␈αcould␈αbe␈αdefined␈αas␈αan␈αattempted␈α␈↓↓science␈αof␈αcommon␈αsense␈↓,␈αor␈αelse␈αthe␈α␈↓↓science␈α
of
␈↓ α∧␈↓↓common sense␈↓ should be a definite part of philosophy.)
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Artificial␈α⊂intelligence␈α∂has␈α⊂a␈α∂another␈α⊂component␈α∂in␈α⊂which␈α∂philosophers␈α⊂have␈α⊂not␈α∂studied,
␈↓ α∧␈↓namely␈α
␈↓↓heuristics␈↓.␈α Heuristics␈α
is␈α concerned␈α
with:␈α given␈α
the␈α facts␈α
and␈α a␈α
goal,␈α how␈α
should␈αit
␈↓ α∧␈↓investigate␈α
the␈α
possibilities␈αand␈α
decide␈α
what␈α
to␈αdo.␈α
On␈α
the␈α
other␈αhand,␈α
artificial␈α
intelligence␈αis␈α
not
␈↓ α∧␈↓much concerned with aesthetics and ethics.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Not␈α∪all␈α∀approaches␈α∪to␈α∪philosophy␈α∀lead␈α∪to␈α∪results␈α∀relevant␈α∪to␈α∪the␈α∀artificial␈α∪intelligence
␈↓ α∧␈↓problem.␈α∞ On␈α∂the␈α∞face␈α∞of␈α∂it,␈α∞a␈α∞philosophy␈α∂that␈α∞entailed␈α∞the␈α∂view␈α∞that␈α∞artificial␈α∂intelligence␈α∞was
␈↓ α∧␈↓impossible␈α∂would␈α⊂be␈α∂unhelpful,␈α⊂but␈α∂besides␈α⊂that,␈α∂taking␈α⊂artificial␈α∂intelligence␈α⊂seriously␈α∂suggests
␈↓ α∧␈↓some␈α
philosophical␈αpoints␈α
of␈αview.␈α
I␈αam␈α
not␈αsure␈α
that␈α
all␈αI␈α
shall␈αlist␈α
are␈αrequired␈α
for␈αpursuing␈α
the
␈↓ α∧␈↓AI goal - some of them may be just my prejudices - but here they are:
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$8.1.␈αThe␈αrelation␈αbetween␈αa␈αworld␈αview␈αand␈αthe␈αworld␈αshould␈αbe␈αstudied␈αby␈αmethods
␈↓ α∧␈↓akin␈αto␈αmetamathematics␈αin␈αwhich␈αsystems␈α
are␈αstudied␈αfrom␈αthe␈αoutside.␈α In␈α
metamathematics␈αwe
␈↓ α∧␈↓study␈α∀the␈α∀relation␈α∀between␈α∪a␈α∀mathematical␈α∀system␈α∀and␈α∪its␈α∀models.␈α∀ Philosophy␈α∀(or␈α∪perhaps
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓↓metaphilosophy␈↓)␈αshould␈α
study␈αthe␈αrelation␈α
between␈αworld␈αstructures␈α
and␈αsystems␈αwithin␈α
them␈αthat
␈↓ α∧␈↓seek␈αknowledge.␈α Just␈αas␈αthe␈αmetamathematician␈α
can␈αuse␈αany␈αmathematical␈αmethods␈αin␈α
this␈αstudy
␈↓ α∧␈↓and␈αdistinguishes␈αthe␈α
methods␈αhe␈αuses␈α
form␈αthose␈αbeing␈α
studied,␈αso␈αthe␈α
philosopher␈αshould␈αuse␈α
all
␈↓ α∧␈↓his scientific knowledge in studying philosphical systems from the outside.
␈↓ α∧␈↓ Thus␈α∂the␈α⊂question␈α∂␈↓↓"How␈α∂do␈α⊂I␈α∂know?"␈↓␈α∂is␈α⊂best␈α∂answered␈α∂by␈α⊂studying␈α∂␈↓↓"How␈α∂does␈α⊂it␈α∂know"␈↓,
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu29␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓getting␈αthe␈α
best␈αanswer␈αthat␈α
the␈αcurrent␈αstate␈α
of␈αscience␈αand␈α
philosophy␈αpermits,␈αand␈α
then␈αseeing
␈↓ α∧␈↓how this answer stands up to doubts about one's own sources of knowledge.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$8.2.␈α
We␈α
regard␈α
␈↓↓metaphysics␈↓␈α
as␈α
the␈αstudy␈α
of␈α
the␈α
general␈α
structure␈α
of␈α
the␈α world
␈↓ α∧␈↓and␈α
␈↓↓epistemology␈↓␈α
as␈α
studying␈α
what␈α
knowledge␈α
of␈α
the␈α
world␈α
can␈α
be␈α
had␈α
by␈α
an␈α
intelligence
␈↓ α∧␈↓with␈α given␈αopportunities␈α to␈αobserve␈α and␈αexperiment.␈α We␈α need␈αto␈α distinguish␈α
between␈α what
␈↓ α∧␈↓can␈α be␈αdetermined␈α about␈αthe␈α structure␈αof␈α humans␈αand␈αmachines␈α by␈α scientific␈α research␈α over
␈↓ α∧␈↓a␈α
period␈α
of␈α time␈α
and␈α
experimenting␈αwith␈α
many␈α
individuals,␈αand␈α
what␈α
can␈αbe␈α
learned␈α
by␈αin␈α
a
␈↓ α∧␈↓particular␈α∂situation␈α∂with␈α⊂particular␈α∂opportunities␈α∂to␈α⊂observe.␈α∂ From␈α∂the␈α⊂AI␈α∂point␈α∂of␈α⊂view,␈α∂the
␈↓ α∧␈↓latter␈α∞is␈α∞as␈α∞important␈α∞as␈α∞the␈α∞ former,␈α∂and␈α∞we␈α∞suppose␈α∞that␈α∞ philosophers␈α∞would␈α∞also␈α∂consider␈α∞it
␈↓ α∧␈↓part␈α∞of␈α∞epistemology.␈α∞ The␈α∞possibilities␈α∞of␈α∞reductionism␈α∞ are␈α∞also␈α∞different␈α∞ for␈α∞ theoretical␈α∞ and
␈↓ α∧␈↓everyday␈α⊂epistemology.␈α∂ We␈α⊂ could␈α∂imagine␈α⊂that␈α∂the␈α⊂rules␈α∂of␈α⊂everyday␈α∂epistemology␈α⊂could␈α∂be
␈↓ α∧␈↓deduced␈α
from␈α
a␈α
knowledge␈α
of␈α
physics␈α
and␈α
the␈αstructure␈α
of␈α
the␈α
being␈α
and␈α
the␈α
world,␈α
but␈α we␈α
can't
␈↓ α∧␈↓see␈α how␈α one␈αcould␈α avoid␈α using␈α mental␈αconcepts␈α in␈αexpressing␈αknowledge␈αactually␈αobtained␈αby
␈↓ α∧␈↓the senses.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$8.3.␈α It␈α is␈α now␈α accepted␈αthat␈αthe␈αbasic␈αconcepts␈αof␈αphysical␈αtheories␈αare␈αfar␈αremoved
␈↓ α∧␈↓from␈αobservation.␈α
The␈α human␈α
sense␈α organs␈αare␈α
many␈α levels␈α
of␈α organization␈α removed␈α
from
␈↓ α∧␈↓quantum␈α∪mechanical␈α∪states,␈α∪and␈α∀we␈α∪have␈α∪learned␈α∪to␈α∀accept␈α∪the␈α∪complication␈α∪this␈α∀causes␈α∪in
␈↓ α∧␈↓verifying␈α
physical␈α∞theories.␈α
Experience␈α
in␈α∞trying␈α
to␈α
make␈α∞intelligent␈α
computer␈α∞programs␈α
suggests
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈αthe␈α basic␈α concepts␈α of␈α the␈α common␈αsense␈α world␈α are␈α also␈αcomplex␈αand␈αnot␈αalways␈αdirectly
␈↓ α∧␈↓accessible␈α
to␈α
observation.␈α
In␈α∞ particular,␈α
the␈α
common␈α
sense␈α∞ world␈α
is␈α
not␈α
a␈α∞construct␈α
from
␈↓ α∧␈↓sense␈α data,␈α but␈αsense␈α
data␈αplay␈αan␈αimportant␈α
role.␈α When␈αa␈αman␈α
or␈αa␈αcomputer␈αprogram␈α
sees␈αa
␈↓ α∧␈↓dog,␈α⊃we␈α⊃will␈α⊃ need␈α⊃ both␈α⊃ the␈α⊃relation␈α⊃ between␈α⊃ the␈α⊃ observer␈α⊃and␈α⊃the␈α⊃dog␈α⊃and␈α⊃the␈α⊂relation
␈↓ α∧␈↓between the observer and the brown patch in order to construct a good theory of the event.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu30␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ β$8.4.␈α In␈αspirit␈αthis␈α
paper␈αis␈α materialist,␈αbut␈αit␈α
is␈αlogically␈αcompatible␈α with␈αsome␈α
other
␈↓ α∧␈↓philosophies.␈α Thus␈α cellular␈αautomaton␈αmodels␈αof␈αthe␈α physical␈αworld␈αmay␈αbe␈α supplemented␈αby
␈↓ α∧␈↓supposing␈α that␈α
certain␈α complex␈α
configurations␈α interact␈α
with␈α additional␈α
automata␈αcalled␈α
souls
␈↓ α∧␈↓that␈α also␈α interact␈α
with␈α each␈α other.␈α Such␈α
␈↓↓interactionist␈α dualism␈↓␈α won't␈α
meet␈α emotional
␈↓ α∧␈↓or␈α∞ spiritual␈α
objections␈α∞to␈α
materialism,␈α∞but␈α∞it␈α
does␈α∞provide␈α
a␈α∞logical␈α
niche␈α∞for␈α∞any␈α
empirically
␈↓ α∧␈↓argued␈α∞ belief␈α∞in␈α∞ telepathy,␈α∞communication␈α∂with␈α∞the␈α∞dead␈α∞and␈α∞ other␈α∞ psychic␈α∂phenomena.␈α∞ A
␈↓ α∧␈↓person␈α∩who␈α∩believed␈α∩the␈α∩alleged␈α∩evidence␈α∪for␈α∩such␈α∩phenomena␈α∩and␈α∩still␈α∩wanted␈α∪a␈α∩scientific
␈↓ α∧␈↓explanation could model his beliefs with auxiliary automata.
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu31␈↓ ∧
␈↓ α∧␈↓PARTIAL DRAFT␈↓
JApril 22, 1976
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ ε≥REFERENCES
␈↓ α∧␈↓→→→→→→→→References will be supplied←←←←←←←←
␈↓ α∧␈↓John McCarthy
␈↓ α∧␈↓Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
␈↓ α∧␈↓Stanford University
␈↓ α∧␈↓Stanford, California 94305
␈↓ α∧␈↓(this draft of MENTAL[F75,JMC]@SU-AI compiled at 5:02 on April 22, 1976)
␈↓ α∧␈↓␈↓ εu32␈↓ ∧